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Thailand has experienced an average of one attempted or successful military coup 
every four and half years since the overthrow of the absolute monarchy in 1932.1  
However, the last attempted military coup occurred in February 1991 while the following 
14 years were a “coup-free” period.  That has led to the speculation, following the May 
1992 protests, that military coups in Thailand are a thing of the past.2  The fourteen years 
that have passed since the last military coup have seen monumental reforms in the Thai 
political system.  These reforms have had major impacts on the military, the bureaucracy, 
the civilian leadership (to include political parties), and the monarchy.  It is perhaps still 
too early to tell if the reforms implemented since the “Black May” incident in 1992 and 
the evolving roles of other increasingly powerful institutions in Thailand have made 
military coups in Thailand obsolete.3  Yet by providing a theory grounded in the 
 
1 Harold Crouch, “Civil-Military Relations in Southeast Asia,” in Larry Diamond et al., Eds., 
Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Themes and Perspectives. (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns 
Hopkins), 1997, 213. 
2 See James R. Klein, “The Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, 1997: A Blueprint for 
Participatory Democracy,” The Asia Foundation Working Paper Series, 
http://www.asiafoundation.org/Publications/workingpapers.html (Accessed 26 Apr 05), 35-37; Surachart 
Bamrungsuk, “Thailand: Military Professionalism at the Crossroads,” in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Military 
Professionalism in Asia, (Honolulu, Hawaii: East-West Center) 2001, 77; Prawase Wasi, “An Overview of 
Political Reform,” in Duncan McCargo, ed., Reforming Thai Politics, (Copenhagen, Denmark: Nordic 
Institute of Asian Studies), 2002, 21; and Michael Kelly Connors, “Political Reform and the State in 
Thailand,” Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 29, issue 2, 1999, 203. 
3  On May 18, 1992 in Bangkok, heavily armed Thai soldiers attempted to disperse protesters who had 
assembled to protest the appointment of General Suchinda Kraprayoon as Prime Minister.  Protestors 
resisted and the Thai troops opened fire.  Over the course of the next three days repeated attempts were 
made to reassemble by the protestors; the Thai troops continued to attack and kill civilians.  After 44 
civilian protestors were killed and another 38 missing the Monarchy intervened, effectively ending the 
crisis.  The King then appointed a civilian Prime Minister, Anand Panyarachun to head the government.  
The Thai military retreated from its overt role in Thai politics and returned to the “barracks.”  For a further 
discussion on the events and causes of the 1992 democratic uprising see: James Ockey, “Thailand: The 
Struggle to Redefine Civil-Military Relations,” in Mutiah Alagappa, ed., Coercion and Governance: The 
Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia (Stanford: Stanford University Press), 2001; Kevin 
Hewison, “The Monarchy and Democratization,” in Kevin Hewison, ed., Political Change in Thailand, 
Democracy and Participation, (London: Routledge), 1997, 58-74; Ji Ungpakorn The Struggle for 
Democracy and Social Justice in Thailand, (Bangkok: Arom Pongpangnan Foundation), 1997; and Michael 
Conners, “When the Dogs Howl: Thailand and the Politics of Democratization,” in Phillip Darby, ed., At 
the Edge of International Relations: Postcolonialism, Gender and Dependency, (London: Pinter), 1997, 
125-147. 
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historical analysis of the ebbs and flows of Thailand’s dynamic political environment this 
thesis will be able to provide a plausible and convincing answer to the question on 
whether or not there is civilian control of the Thai military (which would support the 
argument that the times of military intervention in Thai politics are over) or if the military 
remains an autonomous institution (which in turn would at least qualify that optimistic 
perspective). 
 
B. RESEARCH SCOPE 
 
In order to analyze the current political situation in Thailand it is important to 
understand the past.  I will take a historically informed look at the vibrant political 
landscape of Thailand starting in 1932.  By looking at the evolving role of the military I 
will establish how other important political actors developed allowing for an evolving 
political climate that saw a once powerful military institution retreat from political 
dominance to the barracks in 1992.  In order to understand the type of civilian control 
that is being established in Thailand today I will focus on some of the important changes 
that have occurred following “Black May” in 1992.  These changes are integral as to 
whether or not the civilian leadership maintains control of the military or if the military 
remains an autonomous military actor.  And finally I will touch on what the United States 
is doing policy wise in relation to civilian military relations in Thailand and make some 
recommendations on what policy makers can do to further objective democratic civilian 




The methodology of this thesis is composed of literature research of books, 
theses, electronic documents, and newspaper articles.  All of these research documents 
will be analyzed and evaluated in order to provide insight into whether there is civilian 
control of the military or if the military remains an autonomous institution.    Based on a 
3 
                                                
case study of three different historical periods in Thailand’s past this thesis will use 
David Pion-Berlin’s concept of autonomy as an analytical framework regarding the 
question of civilian control or military autonomy.  An empirical investigation into three 
different periods and three decision areas in Thailand’s defense related issues will 
demonstrate the shift in civilian control and military autonomy.  Finally, I will focus on 
some primary source documents of various U.S. government programs to help me 
analyze the policy options to suggest reasonable improvements to the current U.S. policy 
regarding Thailand’s civil-military relations. 
 
D. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
 
Much of the historical analysis has been researched in great depth and this thesis 
is only looking to provide a relevant context in which the historical changes that occurred 
during and after the “Black May” incident of 1992.4  This thesis’ historical analysis will 
provide relevant examples of how and why civilian control and military autonomy have 
developed.  The focus will then shift to three relevant periods in Thailand’s political 
history to provide a case study concerning the shift in civilian control of the military.  
And finally, after taking the shift in civilian control of the Thai military into account 
various U.S. policies and policy options will be discussed. 
Chapter II takes a brief historical look at the changing role of the military and the 
evolving political role of influential political institutions in the Thai political 
environment.  This helps set the stage for the events in 1992 and the historic shift in 
power that culminated in the Thai military’s retreat to the barracks.   
Chapter III will focus on some of the changes that have occurred since the “Black 
May” incidents of 1992 and some of the influencing factors that forced the Thai military 
to accept these changes.  I will argue that without the development of other powerful 
 
4 See John L.S. Girling, Thailand Society and Politic (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 1981;  James 
Ockey, “Thailand: The Struggle to Redefine Civil-Military Relations,” in Alagappa, Mutiah, ed.,  Coercion 
and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia, (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press), 2001, 187-208; Kevin Hewison, Political Change in Thailand: Democracy and Participation, 
(London and New York: Routledge), 1997; and Duncan McCargo, ed., Reforming Thai 
Politics,(Copenhagen, Denmark: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies), 2002, among many others for more in 
depth historical analysis. 
4 
institutions, namely the political parties, civilian leadership, and the monarchy it is 
unlikely the military would have been forced to return to the barracks.   
Chapter IV will use David Pion-Berlin’s concept of autonomy to set up an 
analytical framework to demonstrate how military autonomy has been transformed into 
civilian control.  Using a case study of three different time periods in Thailand’s political 
development to demonstrate how control in three important arenas has shifted from a 
level of military autonomy to civilian control.    
Chapter V will evaluate current U.S. policies implemented to assist Thailand’s 
civil-military relationship.  Concentrating on these policies I will recommend changes 
that will assist the United States which is in turn helping Thailand to achieve a more 
democratic objective civilian control of the military. 
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II. THE CHANGING POLITICAL ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN 
THAI POLITICS 1932-1992 
A. OVERTHROW OF THE ABSOLUTE MONARCHY 
 
In June1932, a constitutional system of government was introduced to Thailand 
when a group of military officers and civilian bureaucrats overthrew the absolute 
monarchy and established a guided democracy.  The form of guided democracy the coup 
group established was a unicameral legislature composed of two categories of members-
half elected and half appointed.5  The original coup group consisted of not more than 70 
people who are often referred to as “The Reformers.”   The leaders of the coup came 
from four different groups: senior army officers, junior army officers, navy officers, and 
civilian officials.6  The reformers staked their claim to legitimacy on nationalism and the 
inauguration of constitutional democracy.7  This group initially received considerable 
support from workers, students, and other urban groups but the locus of power was a 
strong bureaucracy.8   
Leading to the overthrow of the absolute monarchy, Thailand had seen the 
adulation of the King sharply decline from King Chulalongkorn (1868-1910) to King 
Prajadhipok’s (1925-1935) reign.  This could be blamed in part on the fact that King 
Chulalongkorn was seen as a farsighted competent king in contrast to Prajadhipok who 
was seen as leading a corrupt and overly extravagant monarchy.9  This degradation of the 
King’s power was also possible because of the reforms of 1910, put in place by King 
Chulalongkorn, which strengthened the military. The strengthening of the military was in 
 
5 Chai-Anan Samudavanija, “Thailand: A Stable Semi democracy,” In Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and 
Seymour Martin Lipset, eds. Politics in Developing Countries. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, Publishers, 
Inc.) 1995, 325. 
6 John L.S. Girling, Thailand Society and Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 1981, 59. 
7 R.H.Taylor, The Politics of Elections in Southeast Asia (New York: Woodrow Wilson Center Press), 
1996, 15. 
8 Hewison, Kevin, Political Change in Thailand: Democracy and Participation (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1997), 11 and Chai-Anan Samudavanija, “Thailand: A Stable Semi democracy,” In Larry 
Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., Politics in Developing Countries. (Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner, Publishers, Inc.) 1995, 325. 
9 John L.S. Girling, Thailand Society and Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 1981, 55. 
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response to the threat of European colonization.  This strengthened military eventually 
developed as a viable oppositional institution able to challenge the dominance of the 
monarchy.  The military leaders of the 1932 coup did not change the political and 
administrative systems created by King Chulalongkorn but transferred state power and 
patronage from the crown to shifting cliques of senior bureaucrats and military officers.10  
The Thai military then used the political and administrative systems established by King 
Chulalongkorn to play a dominant role in Thai politics over the course of the next sixty 
plus years. 
Following the 1932 coup, the Thai military sought to institutionalize its grip on 
political power.  Thailand held its first general election in 1933 but this was only a tool to 
legitimate the political system and process in which competition for power was not linked 
with the electorate but with the factions in the military.11   Another way in which the 
military sought to portray itself as a democratizing force was demonstrated twice in 1933 
when the military “rescued” the parliamentary regime.12  But behind the façade of 
democratic institutions and processes the military retained its power by having the 
Military Council elect half the representatives in the unicameral legislature.13  In 
addition, from 1934-1938 the military budget doubled and the military regime began to 
stabilize.14  Despite the strengthening of the military regime there continued to be 
disunity in the military and among the civilian leadership. 
A critical split occurred among the reformers that helped to foreshadow future 
Thai political developments.  Pridi Phnomyong was the most influential civilian among 
the reformers and an important leader of the 1932 coup group.  Pridi and his followers in 
 
10 James R. Klein, “The Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, 1997: A Blueprint for Participatory 
Democracy,” The Asia Foundation Working Paper Series, 
http://www.asiafoundation.org/Publications/workingpapers.html (Accessed 26 Apr 05), 5. 
11 The Thai military first “rescued” the parliament from the high-ranking bureaucrats invited to head 
the interim government and then from a proroyalist rebellion.  Chai-Anan Samudavanija, “Thailand: A 
Stable Semi democracy,” In Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., Politics in 
Developing Countries. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, Publishers, Inc.) 1995, 326. 
12 James Ockey, “Thailand: The Struggle to Redefine Civil-Military Relations,” in Mutiah Alagappa, 
ed., Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press), 2001, 192. 
13James R. Klein, “The Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, 1997: A Blueprint for Participatory 
Democracy,” The Asia Foundation Working Paper Series, 
http://www.asiafoundation.org/Publications/workingpapers.html (Accessed 26 Apr 05), 6. 
14 John L.S. Girling, Thailand Society and Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 1981, 106. 
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the civilian faction within the reformers presented an alternative ideology to the dominant 
military faction.  However, the civilian faction within the People’s Party did not develop 
into a broad-based political party because of the resistance of the more powerful military 
faction. As a result the civilian factions’ power and influence slowly declined until the 
conclusion of World War II.15  Plaek Phibunsongkhram (Phibun), the most influential 
military leader of the coup group, went on to become Prime Minister in 1938 and began 
to consolidate his hold on power.  He not only strengthened the military’s role in politics 
but sought to militarize Thai society just prior to World War II.16 
 
B. POST WORLD WAR II DEVELOPMENTS 
 
The eventual political outcomes of Pridi and Phibun seem quite ironic considering 
whom they supported in the Second World War.  Phibun threw his support, and hence the 
support of Thailand behind the Japanese.  Pridi organized the “Free Thai” resistance 
movement and sought support of the Allies.  With the eventual Allied victory Phibun was 
forced out of office but not out of politics.  Civilians, influenced by Pridi, were able to 
take control of government.  The promulgation of a new Constitution in May 1946 was 
an attempt by the civilian leadership of Pridi to establish new institutional arrangements 
to minimize the power of the military.17  It was during this brief period from 1945-1947 
that Thailand saw a fully elected Assembly and the rise of political parties. However, 
these political parties were promoted more as vehicles for personal patronage and not as 
institutionalized expression of social forces or political issues.18  The division among the 
political parties along with rampant corruption and inflation (due in part to the War) 
caused immense instability.  From August 1945 to November 1947 there were eight 
 
15 Chai-Anan Samudavanija, “Thailand: A Stable Semi democracy,” In Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, 
and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., Politics in Developing Countries. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 
Publishers, Inc.) 1995, 326. 
16 James Ockey, “Thailand: The Struggle to Redefine Civil-Military Relations,” in Mutiah Alagappa, 
ed., Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press), 2001, 192. 
17 Chai-Anan Samudavanija, “Thailand: A Stable Semi democracy,” In Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, 
and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., Politics in Developing Countries. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 
Publishers, Inc.) 1995, 328. 
18 John L.S. Girling, Thailand Society and Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 1981, 107. 
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cabinets and five different prime ministers.19  The death of King Ananda, under uncertain 
circumstances along with inexperienced civilian leadership set the stage for another 
military coup in 1947.  The coup although not led by Phibun, eventually enabled him to 
once again become Prime Minister.  Pridi attempted a failed countercoup in 1949 and 
eventually went into exile in China.  Despite the fact that Phibun supported the Japanese 
in World War II, Western powers were willing to support him based on his anti-
communist ideology.   
In 1955 after his world tour of Western democracies, Phibun officially sanctioned 
political parties.20  State actors heavily influenced the stronger parties but opposition 
parties were allowed to form.  Phibun began to pursue reform policies that opened up the 
opportunity for greater participation in Thai politics.21  It was during this time that 
Thailand saw perhaps its longest protest march ever held (22 January 1956) and the 
establishment of a Hyde Park-style Speakers’ Corner at Sanam Luang.22  These modest 
political reforms were soon to be overturned under the leadership of Phibun’s successor 
Prime Minister Sarit. 
Phibun, having lost direct control of the military for quite some time was 
overthrown by a military coup led by General Sarit Thanarat.  The reforms seen under 
Prime Minister Phibun toward the end of his regime were eventually suppressed by the 
conservative right of the elite civil society and the military.  It was during the reforms of 
Phibun’s last couple of years as Prime Minister that two prominent opposing factions 
were able to develop.  Police General Phao Sriyanond and Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat 
represented two powerful institutions and a threat to Phibun’s hold on power.  This split 
between Phao and Sarit was originally viewed as an attempt by Phibun to maintain his 
 
19 Chai-Anan Samudavanija, “Thailand: A Stable Semi democracy,” In Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, 
and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., Politics in Developing Countries. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 
Publishers, Inc.) 1995, 328. 
20 James Ockey, “Civil Society and Street Politics in Historical Perspective,” in Duncan McCargo, 
ed., Reforming Thai Politics (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies), 2002, 108 
21 James Ockey, “Civil Society and Street Politics in Historical Perspective,” in Duncan McCargo, 
ed., Reforming Thai Politics (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies), 2002, 108. 
22 James Ockey, “Civil Society and Street Politics in Historical Perspective,” in Duncan McCargo, 
ed., Reforming Thai Politics (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies), 2002, 107. 
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power by manipulating and balancing off these two factions.23  However, with strong 
royal and popular support, Sarit was able to overthrow the Phibun regime in 1957, 
justified in part by Phibun’s economic failure and his alleged links with the coercive 
police.24  When Sarit took over, Phibun and Phao were sent to exile, and Sarit began to 
consolidate his power, effectively ending the competition for commercial power.25 
 
C. SARIT AND THANOM- MILITARY RULE 
 
The Sarit era was characterized by political authoritarianism, economic 
development and massive corruption.26  Initially attempts were made by Sarit to restore 
limited democracy.  After the 1957 coup the constitution was temporarily suspended and 
a caretaker government was appointed.  An election was held in 1958, but as a result of 
the inability of the government to control the internal strife and the deteriorating 
economic conditions, Sarit staged another coup in 1958.27  Prime Minister Sarit 
abrogated the constitution, dissolved the assembly and banned political parties.  Two 
important factors influencing political development during this period continued to be 
fighting communism and promoting development.  The political developments prior to 
Sarit staging his coup in 1958 led to the common perception that democratic processes 
led to inherent instability and were a detriment to economic progress.  Therefore the 
common justification used by one military regime after another has been “national 
security,” and an important part of security was stability.28  And with the rising threat of 
 
23 Chai-Anan Samudavanija, “Thailand: A Stable Semi democracy,” In Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, 
and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., Politics in Developing Countries. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 
Publishers, Inc.) 1995, 329. 
24 Busakorn Suriyasarn, “Thai Military in Politics: Return to the Barracks?” 
http://www.busakorn.addr.com/mil/mil-body.htm, (Accessed 24 Apr 2005). 
25 James Ockey, “Thailand: The Struggle to Redefine Civil-Military Relations,” in Mutiah Alagappa, 
ed., Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press), 2001, 193. 
26 John L.S. Girling, Thailand Society and Politics (Ithaca: Cornell University Press), 1981, 112. 
27 Chai-Anan Samudavanija, “Thailand: A Stable Semi democracy,” In Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, 
and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., Politics in Developing Countries. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 
Publishers, Inc.) 1995, 329. 
28 Busakorn Suriyasarn, “Thai Military in Politics: Return to The Barracks?”  
http://www.busakorn.addr.com/mil/mil-body.htm (Accessed 4 December 2004). 
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external forces, mainly communism, the military was able to garner support from the 
stability conscious elite class.  Sarit also had close ties to the United States and business 
enterprises which helped him facilitate economic development.  
Prime Minister Sarit was able to increase the power he inherited by way of the 
1958 coup with the Interim Constitution in 1959.  The Interim Constitution established an 
all-appointed constitute assembly and also gave tremendous power to the prime 
minister.29  Instead of using democracy as a means of legitimacy, Sarit sought economic 
development, fighting communism, and promoting the role of the Monarchy to garner 
support.  As part of his economic development strategy Sarit began to emphasize private 
enterprise and began to take the state out of economic competition with civil society.  As 
part of his National Development Plan, Sarit brought in huge amounts of American rest 
and recreation money and foreign investment and encouraged civil society to compete for 
it, and in doing so he effectively depoliticized civil society.30  The second way in which 
Sarit was able to legitimize his grip on power was through the fight against the 
communists.  During the Sarit period the military experienced continued growth and an 
expanded role, as the military took over much of the counterinsurgency efforts from the 
police.31  And finally to balance the blowback to his tightening grip on power Sarit 
promoted a greater role for the monarchy and restored many of its ceremonial functions.  
As a prominent Thai scholar points out, Sarit made it possible, without perhaps intending, 
for the monarchy to grow strong enough to play an independent role after his death.32  
Sarit under the auspices of the Cold War struggle against communism used development, 
the counter-insurgency, and the monarchy in an effective way to strengthen his grip and 
in turn the military’s grip on power. 
 
29 Chai-Anan Samudavanija, “Thailand: A Stable Semi democracy,” In Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, 
and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., Politics in Developing Countries. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 
Publishers, Inc.) 1995, 329. 
30 James Ockey, “Civil Society and Street Politics in Historical Perspective,” in Duncan McCargo, 
ed., Reforming Thai Politics (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies), 2002, 120. 
31 James Ockey, “Thailand: The Struggle to Redefine Civil-Military Relations,” in Mutiah Alagappa, 
ed., Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press), 2001, 194. 
32 Thak Chaleomtiarana, Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism, (Bangkok: Bannakit Press), 
1979, 334. 
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Thanom, a faithful follower of Sarit, assumed the post of Prime Minister upon 
Sarit’s death.  Thanom continued the anti-communist struggle through economic and 
political development.  Development was seen by U.S. and Thai policymakers as crucial 
to the counterinsurgency; consequently many programs were aimed at rural areas with the 
military taking the leadership role.33  During the 1960’s Thailand saw an impressive 
annual increase of about 7% per year in GNP (Gross National Product).34  Thanom’s 
military regime benefited from this exceptional growth and with the advice of some more 
liberal minded advisors began to allow a more democratic process to evolve.  A 
constitution was drawn up in 1968 with elections held in 1969.  The Democrats, an 
opposition party of the ruling United Thai Peoples Party (established by the military 
shortly after legalization of political parties in 1968) had done well in the elections.  
There was wide swing of the pendulum in the direction of reform.35  Demand for 
constitutional reform was demanded across all spectrums of society to include the King, 
professionals, teachers, students and workers.36  Thanom, responded by associating his 
opposition to communist insurgency, by reestablishing military rule in 1971, banning 
political parties, abolishing the constitution, and dissolving the legislature.  After 
continued corruption and repression, Thailand saw its first mass uprising in 1973.  It is 
estimated that over 250,000 Thais protested the military government calling for 
restoration of constitutionalism and electoral democracy.37  The military attempted to 
 
33  James Ockey, “Thailand: The Struggle to Redefine Civil-Military Relations,” in Mutiah Alagappa, 
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violently suppress the uprising; killing 75 protestors.38  The King, dissociated himself 
from the violence, and the military was forced to cede power. 
 
D. 1973-1980- TIMES OF INSTABILITY 
 
During the time between the 1973 uprising and a bloody massacre which occurred 
in 1976, Thailand saw one of the few periods prior to 1992 in which civilian leadership 
was controlling Thailand.  The military, however, still played a significant role behind the 
scenes.  Many have looked backed to this period as the time in which civilian leadership 
began to take root.  Development in Bangkok and in the provinces brought about changes 
in the social structure; labor, the provincial business elite, and the middle class all 
expanded greatly.39   In 1974, a constitution was approved and free elections were held in 
1975.  With opposition allowed to develop, a great divide occurred between the left and 
the conservatives.  This divide eventually played itself out when Thanom, the former 
prime minister, returned from exile.  This political divide eventually resulted in the 
bloody events of October 6, 1976, in which 43 protestors were massacred on a soccer 
field.40  For the first time in Thai history, an army coup was presented to the public as a 
blow for moderation and accommodation, as well as for the restoration by stages of a 
parliamentary regime.41  With the support of the King, a new government was formed 
under the prime minister ship of Thanin Kraivichien, a civilian Supreme Court Judge.  
Thanin was a passionate anti-Communist; he established a regime that was in many ways 
 
38 On October 13, more than 250,000 people rallied in Bangkok before the Democracy Memorial, the 
next day troops opened fire on the demonstrators, killing seventy-five, and occupied the campus of 
Thammasat University. King Bhumibol intervened and a compromise was reached: Thanom had resigned 
as prime minister but would remain as supreme commander of the armed forces.  For further discussion 
see: David Morell “Thailand,” Asian Survey, (Feb., 1973), 162-178; and Frank C. Darling, “Student Protest 
and Political Change in Thailand,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 47, no. 1 (Spring, 1974), 5-19. 
39 Benedict R.O’G Anderson, “Withdrawal Symptoms: Social and Cultural Aspects of the October 6 
Coup.” Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, Vol 9, Issue 3, (July-September) 1977, 13-30. 
40 Thongchai Winichakul, "Remembering/Silencing the Traumatic Past: The Ambivalence Narratives 
of the October 1976 Massacre in Bangkok." In Proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Thai 
Studies, (Chang Mai: Chang Mai University), 1996, 276. 
41 R.H. Taylor, The Politics of Elections in Southeast Asia (New York: Woodrow Wilson Center 
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more repressive than those of the military.42  The military once again stepped in on 
October 1977 and staged a coup based on the premise of returning the country to an 
elected polity.  The military agreed that the longer the Thanin government was in power, 
the sooner the communists could achieve victory. The only way to minimize this threat 
was to remove the repressive government from power and return to open politics.43  And 
a general election was held on schedule in April 1979.  Following the upheaval seen in 
the 1970’s, the 1980’s produced steady progress for the democratic process in Thailand. 
 
E. PRIME MINISTER PREM’S RULE 
 
From March 1980 to 1988, General Prem Tinsulanon a retired army commander 
ruled as prime minister of Thailand.  When Prem came to power, Thailand was still 
fighting a communist insurgency.  Based on the recent failure of the United States in 
Vietnam, there were several factions within the military held the belief that the best way 
to fight communism was through democracy.44  A strategy used to suppress the CPT 
(Communist Party Thailand) was building democratic institutions and this policy had the 
support early on from various factions within the military to include The Young Turks 
and the Democratic Soldiers.45  Democracy was viewed as a weapon against 
communism, and therefore the military sought to promote it, but also control it by 
maintaining control over key positions.46  Eventually, the two coup attempts in the 
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43 Sarachart Bamruujsuk, From Dominance to Power Sharing: The Military and Politics in Thailand, 
1973-1992 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 16. 
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1980’s resulted in part from differences over the nature and pace of democratization.47  
Conscious of his vulnerability to challenges from one military faction or another, Prem 
increasingly relied on parliamentary support and made a series of alliances with civilian 
political parties.48  The increasing influence of civilian leadership contrasted with the 
decreasing military influence.  This was evident in 1983, when the military was unable to 
block the implementation of constitutional provisions preventing serving officers from 
being appointed as cabinet ministers or from sitting in the lower house of the National 
Assembly.49  The number of military seats in the senate slowly diminished, and civilian 
politicians, gradually took over cabinet ministries that had earlier gone to (retired) 
military officers.50  It was in this period that Prime Minister Prem was able, in small 
ways to challenge military hegemony by leveraging certain factions within the military 
along with support from civilian leadership to counteract threats from opposing military 
factions.  With the critical support of civilian leaders in the parliament and the Monarchy, 
Prime Minister Prem was able to retain power during the coup attempts of April 1, 1981 
and September 9, 1985.51  The period of Prem’s rule thus brought a new balance under 
semi-democratic institutional arrangements in Thailand’s political environment; 
satisfying the interests of the bureaucracy, the army (or certain factions of it), political 
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F. THE ABORTIVE 1991 COUP 
 
Following inconclusive elections in July 1988, on August 9, Chaitchai 
Choonhavan-a party politician (leader of the Chart Thai Party, which had won the largest 
number of seats in Parliament) and a long retired army officer- was named to head a six-
party coalition government.  Whereas Prime Minister Prem had skillfully managed the 
factions within the military as an effective counter balance, Prime Minister Chatichai was 
not as adept.  The governments prior to PM Chaitchai recognized the political strength of 
the military including its ability to carry out coups and to control the mass media (TV and 
radio stations), and made efforts to avoid such conflict as much as possible.53  PM 
Chaitchai however, was willing to test the strength of the military with an attempt to 
dismiss the military leadership.  It was the planned dismissal of General Suchinda 
Kraprayoon that helped trigger the 1991 military coup.54  The Chatichai government had 
developed a reputation for excessive corruption, while its relations with the military 
deteriorated helping to unite a once divided military.55  Without a faction within the 
military, the monarchy, business elites, or the public willing to support him, the attempt 
by Prime Minister Chaitchai to challenge the military failed; and the military successfully 
carried out the coup on 23 February 1991. 
The Thai military perhaps using it last chance to overtly hold on to power 
attempted to manipulate the 1992 elections.56  This in combination with General 
Suchinda’s broken promise (made during the 1991 military coup) that he would not 
 
53 See Yoshifumi Tamada, “Coups in Thailand 1980-1991: Classmates, Internal Conflicts and 
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and businessman with a questionable background (Narong Wongwan) as Prime Minister.  With Narong 
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assume the Prime Ministership led many to consider the military as corrupt as the civilian 
leadership it overthrew.  This step backwards in the democratic process was met by fierce 
resistance from the masses.  It could be argued and was perceived by some that for the 
first time the protesters were not left wing students but a large majority was the urban 
middle class.  The call for electoral democracy was widespread and with capable civilian 
leadership and intervention of the King, civilians began to exert real control and began to 
challenge the military for the dominant political role for the first time since 1932.  The 
disgrace the military felt, domestically and internationally regarding the massacre in 1992 
should not be underestimated in importance as an impetus for their eventual withdrawal 




The military was the most politically influential institution in Thai politics from 
1932 until the 1992 massacres.  As touched on earlier due to the forward thinking King 
Chulalongkorn, Thailand developed a strong army that was an integral component of the 
Thai state and its ability to resist colonization.  From the coup in 1932 until their 
withdrawal from politics following the 1992 massacre the Thai military has always 
sought to provide stability as a priority and democracy as a legitimizing force.  Army and 
navy officers, key actors in the original coup to overthrow the authoritarian monarchy, 
sought legitimacy through establishing a constitution and an electoral process.  This 
electoral process was often either directly manipulated by the military or indirectly by 
appointing Senate and cabinet members to keep the elected members of the House in 
check.  The political supremacy of the armed forces early in the formative years is clearly 
reflected in the composition of the Cabinet, which between 1932-1958 was comprised of 
nearly 75% of prior military members.57  This stranglehold on power was further 
illustrated by the numerous coups.  During this period there was a relatively constant 
cycle: the formation of “group,” the strategic deployment of force, the rewards of the 
coup, and division over the spoils.58  The military’s dominant influence in the Thai 
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political system during this period can be attributed to an absence of political institutions 
to put a check on their power.  Early on in the process the military sought to consolidate 
not just its grip on its political power but also on its own forces by stationing the bulk of 
their forces in Bangkok.  This concentration of troops to the First Region (Bangkok) 
would be critical in mobilizing troops for use in military coups.59  
The military’s willingness to want to appear legitimate actually enabled an 
environment in which opposition parties could develop.  Starting with the concept of 
guided democracy all the way until the overthrow of a “corrupt” Chatichai government 
the military framed its role as a “protector” of the Thai state.  Unlike other states 
dominated by military rule where the military would often entrench itself in the 
bureaucracy, this was not the case in Thailand.  The Thai military co-opted the 
bureaucracy and needed a legitimizing role to maintain its dominant position.  The Thai 
military, as part of a legitimizing strategy would allow opposition certain political space 
but resort to reversing course if it felt the opposition was getting out of hand.  A strategy 
the military developed to maintain legitimacy but also maintain its grip on power was to 
establish its own political parties to promote the pro-military candidates.  This strategy 
also gave legitimacy to the political process by showing the military, at times was willing 
to work within the system to affect change.  An example of this occurred in 1955 with the 
establishment of the Serimanangasila Party and in 1968 with the United Thai People’s 
Party.60  The development of these parties was in direct response to the advances made 
by opposition parties.  Ultimately, if those advances were too great it would lead to the 
military re-exerting its dominant political power and in several cases banning political 
parties completely.  But by allowing political space, slowly institutions capable of 
challenging the Thai military began to develop. 
The Thai military has always sought to portray itself as a democratic force.  The 
military sought to use democracy as a tool to retain or legitimize its grip on power; but by 
opening up the system it allowed those unhappy with the process a legal outlet to attempt 
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to exert influence.  This need to appeal to the masses would play a critical role following 
the 1992 massacres.  The prior massacres in 1973 and 1976 could be written off by the 
military by referring to the protesters and their leaders as being “outsiders.”  The 1992 
massacre was different in that a large middle class mobilized to protest military 
involvement and fight for a return to the electoral process.  To many, the military had 
overstepped its authority and could not resort to calling the forces of the protest 
“communists.”  This would have profound effects in the years following 1992.  The 








                                                
III. THE EVOLVING CIVILIAN MILITARY RELATIONSHIP IN 
THAILAND SINCE 1992 
A. THE POST-1992 POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 
 
Almost fourteen years have passed since the events of “Bloody May” forced the 
Thai military to retreat to the barracks.  Since 1991, Thailand has not experienced an 
attempted or successful military coup.  During this period the Thai military has 
experienced a historic change in its political role.  The international and domestic 
pressures against military intervention have increased to the point to where the costs of a 
military coup exceed the costs of toleration of civilian control.  As Thailand continues its 
transition to a liberal democracy, the mode of civilian military relations will continue to 
play a crucial role in the process of democratic stabilization and consolidation.   
A major challenge faced by “third wave” democracies such as Thailand is the 
need to prevent the military, displaced from its once privileged position under dominant 
military rule from reasserting itself.61 Thus, so-called “civilian control” of the military 
becomes a core element in the process of establishing sustainable62 and viable 
democracy. In a recently published research note, Greg Foster has described the complex 
relationship between democracy and civilian control in the following way: “It is a 
fundamental premise of democratic civilian relations that civilian control of the military 
is clearly possible without democracy, but democracy isn’t possible without civilian 
control of the military.”63  
In the study of democratic transitions in general and democratization in Thailand 
specifically, social scientists have tended to neglect systematic analysis of how politically 
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powerful militaries can be placed under civilian control.64 However, especially in young 
democracies such as Thailand, which are established on the legacies and rudiments of 
long-lasting military rule, “keeping the military out of politics” and “keeping civilian 
authorities from drawing the military into politics” are major challenges.65  
In order to analyze the prospects of the Thai military from intervening to assert its 
once dominant role I will focus on the events surrounding the “Bloody May” incident 
through current developments and how they have affected the military’s coercive force 
potential and presumably less-democratic predilections, 
Thailand, following the events of 1992, was seen as in the second stage of 
democratic transition, having successfully passed through the first stage.  The first stage, 
transition, aims at the installation of a democratic government.  In analyzing Thailand 
this thesis is concerned mainly with the second stage of democratization, namely the 
consolidation of democracy.  A democracy may be regarded as consolidated if its 
presence is accepted by the population (sustainable legitimacy) and if political actors 
assume institutions created in the first stage will last indefinitely.66  And as Thailand 
moves towards democratic consolidation issues such as civil-military relations require 
increased attention to ensure continued democratic advances.  Recognizing the increased 
roles of both the business community and the monarchy will allow my research to focus 
on some of the changes that have occurred which forced the military to accept a reduced 
role in Thai politics and to adopt the concept of civilian control of the military by 
democratically elected civilian leaders.   
In this chapter three prime causes accounting for the changing role of the military 
in Thai politics will be analyzed: 
- socioeconomic development, particularly economic growth and subsequent social and 
economic structural changes 
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- related to the first factor, the emergence of (provincial) business as a political force 
which, for the first time in post-1932 Thai politics, strengthened the formation of a 
viable counter-power to the military’s power – autonomous political parties 
- the changing role of the institution of the monarchy and, as the human face of that 
institution, the ebbs and flows of political influence of King Bhumipol, the reigning 
monarch since 1946. 
 
These external factors rather than military internal variables such as factionalism 
and intra-military power relations, account to a very significant degree for the course of 
events following the massacres in 1992. Internal military factors and other external 
factors were significant in forcing a changing role in the political role of the Thai 
military.  However, the analysis conducted in this chapter is an exercise in ‘partial 
explanation’ of the causes of greater civilian control of the military following the 1992 
massacres.  
This chapter will attempt to explain three of the most important domestic factors 
in creating and supporting an environment able to support civilian control of the military. 
These three factors were chosen because – as most scholars of civil-military relations in 
Thailand seem to believe they are the most influential factors that shaped the necessary 
institutional arrangements for greater civilian control of the Thai military since 1992.   
Economic development caused the development of a business class in Thailand.  This 
business class, which had become increasingly influential, was able to assume the 
dominant political role in Thailand with the assistance of another Thai institution, the 
monarchy.  It wasn’t until 1992 that Thai business groups were willing to challenge the 
military vice co-opt them.  This is where the monarchy and its legitimacy with the Thai 
people played a critical role.  Without the monarchy, it is unlikely the military would 
have retreated to the barracks in 1992, and allowed a competing institution (civilian 





                                                
B. THAI CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS SINCE 1992: OVERVIEW 
 
The historical legacy of a dominant political role for the Thai military has been 
challenged by a variety of institutional and constitutional changes since the “Bloody 
May” massacre in 1992.  As General Wimol Wongvanich, the new Army Chief after the 
1992 uprising, said: “The present world emphasizes three issues: democracy, human 
rights, and environmental protection.”67  Democracy was accepted by civil society, as 
well as by political society, as a requirement for Thai politics.68  It was clear to the 
military it needed to change its political role and abandon its most utilized tool, military 
coups, to gain political power.  The typical pattern for a military coup to take place, for a 
military dictatorship to be installed, for certain basic changes and appointments to be 
made which the army had wanted, and for the army then to hand back gradually to a 
civilian administration appears to have finally been broken.69  Following the events of 
1992 three important factors and institutions have helped to control military coups and in 
turn check the military’s political power: (1) economic factors, (2) political parties, and 
(3) the monarchy.  Due to these powerful checks on the military’s power several 
important institutional changes were implemented and it appears the vicious cycle of 
military coups in Thailand has come to an end. 
The dominant role of the Thai military in politics has been affected by a changing 
political environment.  Examples of this include; the disgrace felt by the military 
following the 1992 massacre, the resulting constitutional changes in 1997, the rising 
influence of political parties, and the gradual strengthening of civilian leaders to include 
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the King.70  Since 1992 institutions external to the military have implemented policies 
which have seriously impacted and curtailed some of the military’s powers.  Immediately 
following the massacre in 1992 Prime Minister Anand was able to do away with the 
Capital Peace-Keeping Command an integral tool the Army chief had that gave him 
access to control TV programs and authority over the Navy and the Air Force in times of 
crisis.71  For riot control, the use of military forces, as in other democratic countries now 
requires cabinet authorization.  The civilian government has also been able to cut the 
military budget as a consequence of the financial crisis of 1997 (with the consequence of 
reducing an illegal source of military income from commissions for arms purchases), 
reduce the number of military attaches in Thai embassies, and to have a greater role in 
allocation of resources (e.g. the government took back the proceeds for military-owned 
radio stations).72  The Chuan government also revived a committee in the Ministry of 
Defense that oversees the purchase of all weapons and was able to reduce increases in the 
military budget at a level below the average increase in other ministries.73  Other critical 
institutional changes implemented in the 1997 Constitution include a democratically 
elected Senate, an elected Prime Minister, and active duty military can not serve on the 
cabinet or in the Senate.  The appointed senate positions and previous constitutions 
allowing for an appointed Prime Minister were powerful tools in the past for the military 
to gain and maintain political control.  The democratic process has made some clear gains 
in implementing some institutional changes necessary to move towards democratic 
civilian control of the military but Thailand still faces many challenges.  
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The historical legacy of the Thai military of launching coups and engaging in 
business and corruption are among many obstacles that must be overcome in developing 
a more Western-style professionalism.  Several problems that must be addressed before 
the transition to objective civilian control of the military can occur include a defined 
military role, the promotion process, and the development of competent civilian 
leadership in military matters.  Since the defeat of the Thai communist insurgency in 
1984 and the end of The Cold War the Thai military has been lacking in a clearly defined 
“enemy.”  As stated by Huntington a clearly defined external military mission is critical 
to successful democratic civilian control of the military.74  The constitution of Thailand 
has stipulated the following missions for the Royal Thai Armed Forces: (1) To defend the 
country and sovereignty (2) to maintain internal stability in the country (3) to maintain 
peace and order in the country (4) to assist in the development of the country.75  The 
fourth mission of development has been a focus of the military following the defeat of the 
Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) but this developmental role helps to blur the line 
between a military and political role for armed forces.  To begin to establish a defined 
mission Thailand implemented defense reform, which was approved by the Defense 
Council in 1999, formulated partly on the basis of scenario planning.76  Although this 
method has been around in more advanced countries for quite a number of years, it is still 
relatively new and challenging concept for Thailand’s military forces.   
A major challenge facing the civilian leadership since 1992 has been 
implementing reforms to reduce the size of the military and reform the promotion 
process.  The size of the Thai military together with paramilitary forces in 2003 
numbered more than 314,000 troops.77  By comparison the military in the Philippines, 
with a population of 87.8 million versus 65.4 million in Thailand, is comprised of 
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106,000 troops.78  In addition to its overall size the Thai military has far too many 
generals.  By July 1998 there were 1,859 generals-616 without responsibilities-and based 
on increased class size of the military academies there appears little relief in sight.79  In 
1997, Prime Minister Chuan Leekpai attempted to help resolve this problem by extending 
an early retirement package offered by his predecessor yet this program was not very 
effective in solving the problem.80  Senior generals were not willing to give up their very 
profitable and influential positions for the sake of retirement.  The promotion process and 
the appointment process continue to be seen as an entitlement vice an institutional need; a 
shift in the nature of promotion would contribute substantially to the civilization of the 
military.81  Until the civilian leadership is able to challenge the military on military 
issues, such as promotion and troop strength, legislative oversight and hence civilian 
control will be in question.  The Thai parliament has not sufficiently empowered itself to 
exercise civilian control and oversight over the fundamental problem of the size and the 
promotion process of the military. 
Elected civilian leaders of the Thai Parliament generally lack the capacity to 
debate military affairs, especially at the strategic and tactical levels.82  As a result it has 
been very difficult for the parliament to have an effective control over military issues, 
such as defense budget, weapon acquisition programs, and arms deployment policy.  The 
economic crisis of 1997 did allow for some budget cuts, forced the service commanders 
to appear in person in front of the defense committee to defend their budgets, and 
scrapped some major arms acquisition projects but the important issue of supply and 
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budget remains a pressing concern in Thai civil-military relations.83  In most major 
democratic countries, there are civilian-led independent research institutions that 
concentrate on military and security affairs.84  Civilian experts, civilian think tanks, and a 
vibrant political discussion is lacking in Thailand.  Although both houses of the Thai 
Parliament have Armed Forces Committees, they lack the technical knowledge about 
military and security issues leading to the inability of the parliament to discuss military 
and security affairs.85  For effective civilian control of the military Thailand needs more 
than just the willingness of the military to retreat to the barracks.  It also needs a 
competent civilian leadership to participate and dictate effective control to meet the 
security needs of the state. 
 
C. ECONOMIC FACTORS, POLITICAL PARTIES, AND THE MONARCHY 
 
The environment necessary to facilitate and allow the necessary reforms to 
establish a dominant civilian role in Thai politics continues to be influenced by three 
important factors: (1) economic factors, (2) the political party system, and (3) the 
monarchy.  The slow evolution of these factors and institutions are critical to the 
democratization process and exert pressure on the military to take a more subordinate 
role in Thai politics. 
 
1. Economic Factors 
With participation from the urban middle classes and increasingly powerful 
business groups after the 1992 uprising, many observers came to believe that they were 
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and continue to be the main social forces of democracy.86  Thailand prior to 1992 had 
experienced a period of steady economic growth.  Gross National Product per capita 
increased from $360 in 1975, $801 in 1985, to $1840 in 1992.87  This economic boom 
brought rapid change that transformed Thailand from a rural, overwhelmingly 
agricultural society, to an urbanizing society where non-agricultural pursuits began to 
dominate.88  This change clearly established an environment in which not only the 
middle class but the business elites began to pursue political goals through the electoral 
process.  Economic growth gave more opportunity for businessmen to participate in 
politics.  In the past, they were behind the scenes, giving support, especially financial 
support to political candidates.  But in the 1992 elections, they came out openly as 
candidates or members of political parties.89  In 1992, the military numbered 152 out of 
260 Senate members, but in 1996 the military got only 48 seats; where as 46 businessmen 
and 81 civilian bureaucrats were appointed.90  And finally when the senate was elected in 
2000, retired military officers won only 18 of 200 seats.91  In addition to the 
constitutional changes calling for an elected senate it is clear in Thailand that economic 
development has created an alternative civilian source of patronage that has also 
diminished the importance of the Thai military’s patronage.  The business elites and the 
capital class clearly were an agent of change towards greater civilian control of the 
military in the years following the 1992 massacre.92  Increasingly businessmen and the 
capital class turned to political parties to solidify their grip on political power. 
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The economic growth of Thailand faced a serious challenge with the Asian 
financial crisis of 1997.  The crisis did however present an opportunity for the Chuan 
leadership to implement greater control and introduce some reduction in the military’s 
budget.  A new plan was introduced to reduce troop levels by 72,000 men over a 12 year 
period.93  In addition equipment procurement was to be centralized under the Defense 
Council, and there were attempts to reduce the number of military officers sitting on this 
important body.94  Although these plans were met with varying levels of resistance it 
demonstrated both the civilian leadership’s willingness to confront military reform and 
the impact economic factors had on civilian military relations.  It can of course be argued 
that the reform measures introduced by Chuan following the financial crisis were as 
much about cost savings as about subordinating the military to civilian political control.95  
Either way, economic factors have increased in importance in influencing the relationship 
between the civilian elites and the military.  As Thailand becomes a more economically 
advanced and dynamic state the military will continue to be influenced and perhaps 
controlled to a greater extent by civilian leadership acting in the interests of increasingly 
powerful business groups. 
In sum Thailand experienced economic growth and social change which gradually 
eroded the political role of the military.  With economic development came increased 
criticism of the military domination of politics.96  This economic growth brought about 
social change that ultimately undermined the military’s capability to run the country and 
legitimize its rule.  Ansil Ramsay observed that political participation in decision making 
in Thailand began to extend to the business elite, who began to play a major role in Thai 
Cabinets and in economic decision making.97  The consequence was the rise of the 
middle class and business elites which lead to an outlet for their political voice: party 
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politics.  This in turn helped to weaken the social, economic, and political power of the 
military.  The eventual rise of party politics led to the erosion of bureaucratic 
encapsulation of certain core institutions of economic policy-making and weakened the 
political power of the military.98  The following section of this chapter will analyze the 
rise of party politics and the expansion of business interests. 
 
2. Political Parties 
Political parties in Thailand are an evolving institution in Thailand.  Political 
parties were first seen in Thailand back in 1945-46 more as vehicles of personal 
patronage, not as the institutionalized expression of social forces or political issues.99    
The military, prior to 1992, had spent decades promoting development and democracy.100  
It was during times of democratic advancement when political parties were sanctioned 
and promoted.  Political parties eventually developed as a means to marshal funds and 
appropriate power amongst the powerful civilian factions.101  Political parties, as part of 
the political process, allowed the wealthy business class a legitimate tool to begin to exert 
greater influence.102  The close links between civilian politicians and the business sector 
allowed for the development of political parties that grew in opposition to the once 
dominant military.103  Political parties were a legitimate oppositional tool in the Thai 
political landscape when the military began its retreat to the barracks in 1992.    
Thailand witnessed three large influential parties emerge in the 1970’s that played 
an influential role during the transformation from a semi-democratic state to a more 
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democratic state.104  Only one party, the Democrat Party formed in 1946 predates the 
uprising in October of 1973.105  The Democrats have been described as a centralist party 
with left leaning tendencies.106  In the past the Democrats agenda has had its programs 
described as “soft socialism,” a package of cautious economic reform, higher taxes, 
subsidized crops and land redistribution.107 The other two large parties were formed in 
1974, the Chart Thai and the Social Action Party.  Chart Thai was formed by three 
relatives of Field marshal Phin Choonhavan, who had been a key supporter of Marshal 
Phibun.108  The Chart Thai was formed on a firmly pro-business line.  The third party the 
Social Action party was based on rural land reform and no longer retains any 
representation in the parliament.  But these three parties began to establish an outlet in the 
political process for civilian leaders to begin to affect change in opposition to the 
military. 
Throughout the last half of the last century Thailand experienced rapid 
urbanization and modernization, which in turn led to a more prominent middle and 
business class.  This growth in the middle class parallels the growth of political parties.  
In 1981 a law was indeed passed requiring candidates to campaign under party 
banners.109   It is no surprise then that these urban elites sought an outlet for their voice.  
An interesting trend since 1988 has been the gradual growth of the largest parties 
coinciding with the departure of the military from the cabinet in that same year. (See 
Table 1)110  This has meant more rewards and greater control of the military for civilian 
politicians.111  Thai political parties in spite of all their shortcomings have served a 
valuable outlet as an outlet for opposition forces to project their voice within the political 
system. 
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Table 1.   Size of Largest Political Party in the Thai Parliament112 
 







1988 Chat Thai 87 Kitsangkhom 54 141 357 
1992a Samakkhitham 79 Chat Thai 74 153 360 
1992b Democrat 79 Chat Thai 77 156 360 




125 Democrat 123 248 393 
2001 Thai Rak Thai 248 Democrat 128 376 500 
2005 Thai Rak Thai 375 Democrat 96 471 500 
 
 
The 2001 election helped reshaped Thailand’s electoral landscape.  The January 
2001 elections pitted the Democrats and its incumbent Chuan against the new and rising 
Thai Rak Thai party.  Advocating reform for the rural voters and after many accusations 
of vote buying Thaksin and the Thai Rak Thai prevailed in the general elections.  Thai 
Rak Thai, the current dominant political party in the Thai parliament was founded by 
Thaksin in July 1998, acquired much of its political base by recruiting former MP’s and 
members of existing political factions.113  An example of this occurred in early 2002 
When the New Aspiration Party (NAP) led by former army Chief Chavalit Yongchaiyudh 
was effectively taken over in early February by Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra's 
Thai Rak Thai (TRT) Party following a poll of its members.114  That move effectively 
neutralized Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra's rivals in the ruling Thai Rak Thai (TRT) 
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Party and consolidated his control over parliament.115  In March 2002, Thaksin presided 
over a residual grand coalition of Thai Rak Thai, Chart Tai and Chart Pattana- essentially, 
the entire parliament with the exception of the Democrats.116  Thaksin’s first 
administration was a melting pot of former politicians, owners of large businesses, and 
various political activists.117  Going into the 2005 elections Thaksin’s TRT and its 
political allies continued to constitute an overwhelming base of 338 seats in the 500-seat 
House of Representatives of the National Assembly, and the prime minister was set up to 
continue to dominate the political agenda.118  
Thaksin’s relationship with the military differs from previous administrations in 
that Thaksin and his TRT party have set out to convert the military into a direct source of 
political support, a major component of his power base.119  Thaksin’s consolidation of 
power appears to be unchecked for the near future as demonstrated by Thai Rak Thai’s 
overwhelming victory at the polls in 2005 and its hold on all but two of the key minister 
posts.120  With Thai Rak Thai gaining 375 of the 500 seats in parliament, and with the 
Democratic party only having a good showing in the south, it appears Prime Minister 
Thaksin will continue to be the most influential political actor in the near future.121  The 
Democratic Party did not do well in Bangkok despite predictions of a strong showing and 
the recent election of a Democratic governor.  Whether or not the Democrats can pick up 
the pieces and remain a viable oppositional party remains to be seen.  Regardless, 
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Thaksin’s firm grip on power and his ability to consolidate his hold on power has the 
potential to threaten the democratic process and can hamper the progress of objective 
democratic civilian control of the military.122 
 
3. The Monarchy 
With the retreat of the military to the barracks in 1992 it becomes important to 
analyze the monarchy, an increasingly influential institution that helped enable civilian 
leadership to begin to exert greater control of the military. On several occasions between 
1973 and 1991 the palace “positioned” itself in such a way as to restrain certain actions of 
military groups, which would have toppled the ruling government, caused bloodshed, or 
precipitated unpredictable crises.123  This section will take a look at the changing role of 
the institution of the monarchy and, as the human face of that institution, the ebbs and 
flows of political influence of King Bhumipol Adulyadej, the reigning monarch since 
1946.   
“First of all, he is a god,” said the kingdom’s leading novelist, when asked what 
the king stands for.  “He is a sacred being.  Secondly he is the ‘Big Father’ or head of the 
family…And he is the godhead of Thai nationalism.  He is more than a symbol.  He is an 
actual godhead to Thai pride, nationalism, and vanity.”124  As one of the three pillars of 
Thai society along with Nation and Religion, the King has exerted varying levels of 
influence on the Thai political system.   
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of the armed forces and its “non-involvement in low partisan politics”. 
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King Bhumipol is the constitutional monarch of Thailand. Unlike all of the 
colonized states in Southeast Asia, Thailand has maintained a constitutional monarch.  
Born in 1927 he was not formally crowned as Rama IX until 1950.  His brother King 
Ananda Mahidol assumed the throne from 1935-1946 and was mysteriously shot dead in 
1946 at the age of 21.125  It was after this tragedy that the young Bhumipol became King.  
On his return from Switzerland in December 1951, Bhumipol was the first mature King 
to take up permanent residence in Thailand since the abdication of his uncle, King 
Prajadhipok, in March 1935.126  Between 1951-1957, the King had to accept the 
constitutional role prescribed by the amendment of the 1932 Constitution in 1952, which 
basically defined the monarch as ruler placed above politics, whose main duty was to do 
whatever the government told him- a ceremonial ruler or, put less kindly a figurehead or 
a ‘rubber stamp,’ to be used whenever necessary by the ruling elite.127 
His 59 years on the throne have seen a transition from a young powerless King to 
an influential force in Thai politics.  The king’s first real foray into the political arena was 
under Sarit in 1958.  Sarit encouraged the king, who had been restricted in his 
appearances by previous regimes, to tour the provinces, eliciting reverence and respect 
from up-country people.128  However, after only a few years the King stood up and 
overruled Sarit forcing him to surrender a frontier temple back to Cambodia.129  A small 
gesture but one that showed he wasn’t a puppet of the military even early in his public 
responsibilities.  This was the start of a political institution that has played a critical role 
in checking the military’s role at critical junctures in the democratic process.   
His influence was gained through steady leadership in times of crisis.  His first 
opportunity came in 1973; it was due in part to his intervention that Thanom and Praphas 
were forced to leave the country while he attempted to restore order.  He appointed a 
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civilian academic as prime minister and convened the National Assembly.130  It can also 
be argued that by the time Prem had come to office in the 80’s he was influential in the 
failure of two military coups, one in 1981 and the second in 1985.  The young Turks had 
not gained the legitimacy necessary to succeed in their coup in part for failing to receive 
the requisite consent from the king.131  It is also during times in which the constitution is 
abrogated or a parliament abolished and the people’s mandate reverts to the King.  This 
occurred in 1991 following the coup and with the King’s appointment of Anand 
Panyarachun as premier.132  It was also enacted following the massacres of 1992 when 
the king publicly reprimanded Suchinda and his opponent Chamlong while having both 
men kneel, an act which gained credibility with the masses.  It was more than just a 
symbolic measure; it was a powerful visual force to demonstrate the King’s influence in 
Thai politics.  King Bhumipol Adulyadej had assumed the role of popular sovereignty in 
bestowing a legitimate right to rule upon otherwise democratically illegitimate 
regimes.133  In 1980’s the military had to take special head of the monarchy as it was the 
one institution that could lend legitimacy to any political faction; the failed April 1981 
and September 1985 coups to topple PM Prem confirmed that any attempt to overthrow 
the government which did not receive royal sanction would fail.134  The public powers of 
the King emanate not from a written constitution, but from the affection, devotion, and 
trust that the Thai people have for him.135  The military’s tool to gain and retain power, 
the military coup now needs approval from the monarchy. 
The King, through careful political intervention at crucial times has helped shape 
the role of the monarchy as a powerful institution.  It is only through adept statesmanship 
and his character, which allowed him to strengthen his limited powers in order to advance 
democratic principles and development of Thailand as a modern state.  The King has 
been able to act as a powerful actor checking the power of the military at critical 
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junctures in Thailand’s past.  This was due in no small part to his individual ability to 
develop the goodwill of the people without overstepping his boundaries of his limited 
powers.  There are some questions concerning the succession of the throne.  Some are 
calling his first-born son as the rightful heir to the throne.  But many question the crown 
princes behavior and manner as not befitting of the next King of Thailand.136  Many 
intellectuals and powerful forces within the system are calling for his second daughter to 
assume the throne.  This instability could cause the delicate political balance to be 
disturbed.137 
In the past it was the Thai military pulling the strings of power, it now appears as 
if the monarchy and PM Thaksin, through Thai Rak Thai, appear to be competing 
institutions using the military as a tool to maintain and gain influence in the Thai political 
arena.  This was demonstrated in 2002 during the dispute over the United Wa State Army 
(USWA).138  The USWA, who were the principal manufacturer and peddlers of 
methamphetamines destined largely for the Thai market, had the tacit support of 
Myanmar’s ruling military clique.139  Given the Thaksin administration’s warm relations 
with the Burmese generals and the Thai army’s preference for tough stance against the 
USWA clashes were inevitable.140  A tense relationship between the army chief General 
Surayud and Prime Minister Thaksin developed.141  General Surayud had been appointed 
as Army Commander-in-Chief during the second Chuan government (1997-2001) due to  
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border. After the Shan United Army surrendered and was driven from the region in hard-fought battles, the 
Government of Myanmar ordered the Wa to vacate the region. The Wa defied the order and, with eventual 
government acquiescence, occupied the area, referred to as their Southern Military Region (SMR) or 
Southern Military Command. The Government of Myanmar tolerates the Wa, due to the UWSA’s 
significant military force, a standing cease-fire agreement and the illicit revenues generated by UWSA 
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his special links with former Prime Minister Prem.  Prem’s support for General Surayud’s 
hard-line stance on the USWA was seen as reflecting the King’s own views, given his 
calls for the need to combat the drug threat.142  Prime Minister Thaksin was able to 
effectively transfer Surayud and replace him with a supporter by shrewdly announcing 
the annual military reshuffle a month earlier than normal.143 Surayud was then appointed 
as the privy councilor in charge of security and development following his retirement in 
2003 and sent a clear signal that he was looked upon with great favor in royal quarters 
and could be interpreted as a rebuke to Thaksin.144  Although the monarchy came out on 
the losing side of the political struggle, it demonstrates that as an institution the monarchy 
exerts greater influence over the Thai military than it had in the past.  Thaksin’s skillful 
political maneuvering also illustrates greater civilian control of the military. 
With the King getting on in age it will be interesting to see if his successor retains 
some of the hard fought influence he has been able to attain.  The Economist’s survey of 
Thailand in its early 2002 March edition suggested that the monarchy’s future role fall 
firmly under the Constitution.145  This met stiff resistance from the Thaksin 
administration and the issue was effectively banned.146  The splits between Thaksin and 
the monarchy begin to present a new stage in the political process in Thailand.  The 
monarchy has been a stabilizing force for the steady advancement of the electoral and 
constitutional process and in turn greater civilian control of the military.  It is clear that 
civilian control of the military was enabled in part by the role of the monarchy.  What 
remains to be seen is whether the monarchy will be able to counteract greater subjective 
control of the military on the part of Prime Minister Thaksin. 
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The obstacles faced by the military in contemplating another coup brought about 
by economic factors, the development of the business class and political parties, and the 
monarchy have increased.  The political parties (with support from the business class) 
and the monarchy are two vital institutions that have grown in relative strength to the 
military.  Their ability to counterbalance the legacy of a strong military was extremely 
important to the development of a civilian leadership which could effectively rule 
Thailand.  As Thailand continues in the second stage of democratization towards 
consolidation civil-military relations will play an important role in whether or not 
progress is made.  When the Thai military retreated to the barracks in 1992 the problem 
of civil-military relations was not solved.  As the events since 1992 indicate Thailand still 
faces immense challenges if it is to achieve the type of objective civilian control seen in 
the more developed democratic countries of the world.  While it is a positive sign that 
Thailand has not witnessed an attempted or successful military coup in fourteen years 
there are still questions to how it will react in times of unforeseen crisis.  To better 
determine the level of civilian control and military autonomy in Thailand the next chapter 





                                                
IV.  HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF MILITARY AUTONOMY IN 
THAILAND 
A. DEFINING MILITARY AUTONOMY 
Democratic civil-military relations mean that the military is subordinated to a 
democratically elected civilian government through various constitutional and 
institutional mechanisms. One strategy to analyze the degree to which that task has been 
accomplished is to take a historical perspective and to compare what Pion-Berlin in a 
seminal article has called the “institutional” and the “political autonomy” of the military 
in various periods of Thai history including the most current years. 147 By taking a 
historical perspective on the Thai military’s changing political role and applying David 
Pion-Berlin’s analytical model the analysis brought forward in this chapter will be able to 
determine the degree of civilian control that exists in Thailand today. 
Therefore, in a first analytical step, it is critical to define military autonomy.  
Autonomy refers to an institution’s decision-making authority. As Pion-Berlin clearly 
points out in his research, there is both an institutional and political dimension of military 
autonomy.  Institutional autonomy refers to the military’s professional independence and 
exclusivity.148  Military political autonomy refers to the military’s aversion towards or 
even defiance of civilian control.149  The degree of political autonomy is a measure of the 
military’s determination to strip civilians of their political prerogatives and claim these 
for itself.150  The important distinction being that institutional autonomy within the 
military is not necessarily a barrier to civilian control and can act as a means by which 
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the military guards its core professional functions.151  The unique structure of the military 
will naturally cause the military to remain somewhat independent of civilian policy 
makers and the institutional structure of the military is inherently exclusive.   
Having defined institutional and political autonomy it is important to establish 
criteria to determine what issues are rooted in the professional institutional sphere and 
what issues fall under the political realm.  For an issue to be classified as institutional it 
must cover the core or internal professional functions of the military.  A measurement of 
political autonomy would include issues based on political content and character.  In 
between the institutional and political sphere is a gray area where issues have both 
professional and political content.152  Therefore, there is a spectrum along which some 
issues are more institutional in nature and others which are more political in nature.  This 
chapter will focus on two primarily institutional issues and two political issues. 
Using a snapshot in time during three different periods in Thailand’s history and 
determining the levels of autonomy this chapter will establish both where civilian control 
of the military stands today and whether trends can be determined.  Much like the 
countries Pion-Berlin studied in South America, Thailand has emerged from a period of 
extended authoritarian military rule.153  Therefore, there is some valuable insight that can 
be gained from using similar issues used by Pion-Berlin in his analysis of South 
American countries.  Pion-Berlin argued that in post military authoritarian period the 
armed forces of South America should be able to exert greater control over their internal 
decisions and less control over ostensibly political ones.154  To specify the factors that 
contributed to different levels of autonomy Pion-Berlin organized his data on military 
autonomy by country and decision site.155  His study on autonomy selected five countries 
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that had all recently emerged from long periods of authoritarian rule.156  Next, Pion-
Berlin chose twelve different areas to analyze that represented functions that were critical 
to defense and/or reflected points of contention between the government and the armed 
forces.157  He used a qualitative assessment to determine the level of autonomy in each 
country and on each issue.  Pion-Berlin determined based on his study that the armed 
forces remained significant political actors in the post authoritarian period but they have 
had greater success in guarding “core” professional functions vice those on the 
“periphery” in the democratic order of South America.158 
This study focuses on four different issues, two primarily institutional autonomy 
issues and two primarily political autonomy issues.  Having chosen two issues closely 
related to the institutional sphere of influence and two issues dealing with political issues 
and applying a historical perspective this study will be able to determine trends in the 
level of institutional and political autonomy of the Thai military. The chosen criteria in 
the domain of institutional autonomy are (1) personnel decisions and (2) force levels; 
concerning the political autonomy of the military, they are (3) military budgets and (4) 
military reforms. 
 
1. Personnel Decisions 
Promotion, retirements, and appointments help to shape the professional and 
ideological direction of the armed forces.159  Levels of autonomy pertain to the amount of 
discretion the military enjoys in making personnel decisions.160 If the civilian 
government can approve, reject, or independently recommend personnel decisions, then 
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military autonomy is low.  If the military establishes its own lists of promotions and 
dictates most of the military appointments, then military autonomy is high. 
 
2. Force Levels  
Generally, the Thai military would prefer a larger force to a smaller one to justify 
a greater budget.  Democratic civilian governments would prefer smaller less costly 
forces.161 The level of military autonomy in this issue is a measure of whether troop 
levels have increased, declined, or remained the same during the different periods in Thai 
political development. 
 
3. Military Budgets 
Civilian leaders confronted with scarce economic resources and pressures from 
various sectors of society would prefer to reduce military budgets when possible-and 
where such a move would improve their political position.162  The civilian leadership 
must provide a military budget that will help reduce the military’s participation in rent 
seeking and other economic activities.  Enormous profits from illicit activities facilitated 
the Thai military from giving up or agreeing to a reduction of their share of political 
power.163  But on the other hand, is the civilian leadership willing and competent enough 
to exert budgetary reductions when necessary?  
  
4. Military Reforms  
Where civilians are unable to influence the reform process, military autonomy is 
at its highest.164  Deployment of troops, appointment to the senate, and military missions 
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are some examples of areas of reform that can be measures to what institution has the 
decision-making authority.  
While each of the four aforementioned issues each have both political and 
institutional content; personnel decisions and force levels tend to be on the institutional 
side of the professional-political spectrum and military budgets and  military reform have 
the strongest political content.  Personnel decisions and force levels represent internal or 
core professional functions of the Thai military.  The promotion, appointment, and 
reduction of troops are closely linked to the military’s professional “center.”165    On the 
other hand, military budgets require policy decisions about the allocation of 
governmental resources which naturally involve a great deal of political content.  
Likewise, military reform requires a great deal of political will on the part of civilian 
leaders to effectively implement changes in the armed forces.  Therefore, the level of 
military autonomy in both the personnel decision and troop level areas represent a greater 
indication of institutional or professional autonomy; and military budgets and military 
reform are issues which are more political in character. 
Covering both variants of military autonomy, these four issues will provide a 
basis to analyze the varying level of control and decision-making authority exerted by the 
military in the institutional and political realm.  
Having chosen the categories in which to analyze where the decision-making 
authority rests it is important to select different periods in time in Thailand’s history to 
draw a diachrone comparison, which is a sine qua non for drawing any conclusion about 
the changes (or degree of continuity) that civil-military-relations in Thailand have 
experienced since 1992.  I have chosen to examine three different periods in time in 
Thailand’s history:   
1. The first period this chapter will analyze is the period of 1963-1973.  With 
Thanom as Prime Minister, this political era represented an authoritarian military regime 
prior to the student uprising in 1973 and subsequent calls for democratic reform.   
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2. The next era that will be examined is the period after the “Black May” 
incident in 1992 until the election of Prime Minister Thaksin in 2001.  This period in 
Thailand’s political development witnessed a greater role for civilian leadership in the 
political environment. 
3. Finally, this chapter will analyze Prime Minister Thaksin’s reign from 
2001-present.  The current period demonstrates a consolidation of political power under 
an increasingly influential civilian Prime Minister. 
 
B. MILITARY RULE DURING PRIME MINISTER THANOM’S REIGN 
(1963-1973) 
 
Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn was a staunch anti-Communist who oversaw 
a decade of harsh military rule in Thailand, from 1963 to 1973. This period in time was 
before Thailand had seen massive civil demonstrations and there was no doubt the 
military was in control.166  Prior to PM Thanom, Thailand was led by Field Marshall 
Sarit Thanarat, another military authoritarian leader.  Prime Minister Sarit was a military 
dictator, who during his rule (1959-1963) was able to develop an effective program of 
peace and prosperity for Thailand.167  However, after only four and a half years of rule 
Sarit died after a short illness.168 
On December 9, 1963, the King appointed General Thanom Kittikachorn to 
succeed Sarit as premier.169  Thanom, who ruled from 1963-1973, continued much of the 
same foreign and domestic policies as Sarit.170 Retaining the cabinet that he inherited 
from Sarit, Thanom focused his efforts on seeking to maintain political stability; 
promoting economic development, especially in security-sensitive areas; raising the 
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standard of living; and safeguarding the country from the communist threat at home and 
abroad.171  His political downfall was brought about by the massive civil demonstrations 
of 1973.172  
This period represents the last military regime prior to the democratic uprising of 
1973.  James Ockey argues that prior to 1973, because civilians rarely governed for more 
than a year at a time civil-military relations were a non-issue.173  Yet since 1973 the 
military has not governed without an elected parliament for much more than a year at a 
time.174  Therefore, this section will analyze the Thanom period in order to measure the 
level of political and military autonomy under an authoritarian regime prior to the 
democratic reforms following 1973.  
 
1. Personnel Decisions 
Personnel decisions clearly fell under the control of the military.  Thanom, after 
being appointed as premier, retained his post as Minister of Defense and assumed several 
other positions previously held by Sarit, including Supreme Commander of the Armed 
Forces and Commander-in-Chief of the Army.175  Field Marshal Thanom, General 
Praphat Charusathien, Air Chief Marshal Thawee Chulasap, General Krit Sivara, and 
Police General Prasert Ruchirawong continued to hold approximately the same positions 
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of power from the time Thanom succeeded Sarit until the military coup in 1971.176  
Following the coup until the overthrow of Thanom in 1973 the coup leaders tightened 
their grip on personnel decision making.177  In addition to personnel decisions involving 
the military, Thanom was also able to appoint family members to powerful positions in 
the government.  This was demonstrated with the appointment of his brother Police 
Major General Sanga Kittikachorn as the Deputy Foreign Minister in 1969.178   
 
2.  Force Levels 
During the period of 1963-1973, Thailand faced a challenging internal and 
external threat in the form of communism.179  As an example, in 1970 slightly more than 
one-half of the provinces in Thailand experienced various levels of insurrectionary 
activity.180   In addition to the domestic communist insurgency the situation in Indochina 
perhaps helped justify larger number of troops.  Armed forces per 1000 people increased 
from 2.8 in 1963 to 5.8 in 1973.181  In 1963, Thailand maintained a force of 85,000 
troops; by the time Thanom was forced from office in 1973, the armed forces numbered 
233,000.182  An almost three fold increase in the number of troops demonstrated a firm 
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Table 2.   Military Forces 1963-1973183 
 
This steady increase in force levels will provide a measure to compare against the 
period following the 1992 massacre and Prime Minister Thaksin’s reign.   
 
3. Military Budgets 
Despite an annual increase of 7.6% of Gross National Product; military 
expenditures increased by an average of 13.9%.184  Military expenditures increased as a 
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Table 3.   Military Expenditure as % of GDP 63-73186                                                   
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Two critical factors: a domestic and international communist threat and U.S. 
support put little pressure on Prime Minister Thanom to reduce military budgets from 
1963-1973.  The United States sent 437 million dollars in military aid and arms to 
Thailand during this period.187  An example of this economic support was a $200 million 
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Table 4.   Military Expenditure 1963-1973189 
 
Clearly the Thai military exerted great control over the military budget during the 
Thanom period.  In 1971, an attempt was made by the legislature to implement a small 
decrease in the military budget the military responded by dismissing the legislature and 
proceeded to rule by decree.190  Even accounting for increases in the Thai economy the 
military was able to experience a relatively larger increase in their share of the budget. 
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4. Military Reform 
During his tenure as Prime Minister, Thailand was ruled under repressive military 
rule with a small disorganized fragmented opposition.191  The communist threat and 
strong authoritarian control kept opposition to military domination in check.  Certain 
political reforms were implemented to include the 1968 constitution.192  But these 
reforms and the process of development were viewed more as “tools” against the threat of 
communism than as substantive reforms in civilian control of the military.193  
Throughout his reign Thanom sought to maintain strong military control in both the 
political and military domains, therefore no military reforms were implemented.  Even 
minor attempts at forms of military reform met stiff resistance.  This was demonstrated in 
1971 when the military in response to attempted budget cuts staged a coup to protect their 
power base and reassert their political dominance.194  With the coup the Government 
announced the failure of its “constitutional experiment;” martial law was declared, the 
legislature was closed, the parties were disbanded, and a military junta asserted complete 
control of the nation.195  Throughout the Thanom period the government reminded the 
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C. POST-1992 ERA I 
 
In contrast to the Thanom reign the post-1992 period saw greater civilian 
influence in military matters.  Yet the military maintained a certain degree of autonomy.  
The Thai military was however, forced to undergo some major changes following the 
“Black May” incident in 1992.  As demonstrated earlier this was due in part to the rising 
influence of civilian leadership.  Whether or not the changes during this period became 
institutionalized and implemented effectively will be touched on further when examining 
the administration of Prime Minister Thaksin. 
 
1. Personnel Decisions 
Attempts were made during this period to reform certain aspects of personnel 
decisions.  Although Chuan Leekpai never intervened in the military promotions exercise 
during his first term the successive governments of Banharn Silpa-archa (Jul 1995-Dec 
1996) and Chavalit Yongchaiyudh (Dec 1996-Nov 1997) took more of an interventionist 
approach to the process.197  During the second Chuan government (1997-2001), Prime 
Minister Chuan Leekpai did however take the unusual step- especially for a civilian who 
had never served in the military- of also assuming the post of Defense Minister.198  It was 
also during Chuan’s second term that he and his army chief Surayud attempted to expand 
an early retirement project for senior officers; though there were few takers it 
demonstrated a degree of political will on the part of the government to tackle personnel 
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2. Force Levels 
General Wimol Wongawanich, who became Army Commander-in-Chief 
immediately following the events of May 1992, came under pressure to reduce the size of 
the armed forces.200  In 1994 the Thai military witnessed a reduction of 41,000 troops 
from the previous year.201  The troop levels remained at this reduced level of roughly 
250-260,000 personnel until surprisingly enough 1998.  Despite Thailand feeling the 
effects of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis armed forces personnel levels increased from 
266,000 in 1997 to 306,000 in 1998.202  Once again a new plan was introduced by Chuan 
Leekpai to reduce troop levels of 72,000 men over a 12 year period in order for the 
military to better allocate resources in order to modernize the force.203  Yet the military 
was able to resist these proposed changes and troop levels returned to the pre-1992 levels 
in 1998 through 2001.204  The ability of the military to continue to increase troop levels 
despite the severe economic hardships witnessed by Thailand demonstrated the amount 









1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Armed Forces Personnel (in 000's)
 
Table 5.   Troop Levels: Thailand 1992-2001 205 
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3. Military Budgets 
The combination of the crisis of 1992 and the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997 
allowed for a “perfect storm” of allowing civilian leadership in Thailand to begin 
affecting a cut in the military budget.  The pressure exerted by both the civilian 
leadership and civil society because of the economic downturn following the crisis forced 
the military to accept a reduced budget.  The share of the national budget allocated to the 
military had shrunk gradually from 18%, allocated in the 1980s, to about 11-12% in the 
mid-1990s and 9% in 1999-2000.206  Thailand’s military expenditures decreased from 
2784(million in constant US dollars) in 1996 to 1773 in 2001.207  In addition, the 1997 
constitution sought to remove the control of the profitable Channel 5 and various radio 
stations from the military and place them under civilian government control.  The second 
Chuan government (1997-2001) also revived a committee in the Ministry of defense that 
oversees the purchase of all weapons and was able to reduce increases in the military 
budget at a level below the average increase in other ministries.208  This created an 
environment in which the military was forced to accept parliament’s decision to reduce 
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Table 6.   Military Expenditures 1992-2001209  
 
4. Military Reform 
It was during this period that Military reforms began to be seriously discussed.  
Although many of the proposed reforms lacked “teeth” or were not implemented as 
proposed, the rising influence of civilian authority in realm of defense policy can begin to 
be demonstrated.  During his tenure as Army chief, Surayud, with the support of former 
PM Prem and PM Chuan, actively pursued a program of military reform and led a 
crackdown on “mafia colonels” who abused their rank to engage in criminal activity.210  
Another example of proposed reform was an attempt by PM Chuan to put the supreme 
commander of the armed forces and the chief of the major service commands under the 
defense permanent secretary and to restructure the Defense Council by reducing its size 
and thereby reduce the military representatives by more than half.211  Eventually, the 
command structure that emerged was one preferred by the military and the Defense 
Council had the supreme commander as chair, but it demonstrated a willingness of 
civilian leaders to begin to call for reform.212 
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D. POST-1992 ERA II: THE TERM OF THE FIRST THAKSIN 
GOVERNMENT (2001-2004) 
  
Thaksin’s Shinawatra’s rise to power backed by popular support among the 
country’s rural population the dynamic between civilian leaders and the military appears 
to be changing. Where before the generals held the reigns of power, the prime minister is 
now calling the shots and has integrated the military into his power base.213  
Thaksin appears to have changed his tactics in dealing with the military.  
Thaksin’s provoking the military publicly can be traced back to 1996.  Thaksin, who was 
a member of parliament at the time, strongly opposed a military satellite project, due in 
no small part to his own self interest in civilian satellite projects, and made comments 
inciting the military.  The Army radio in turn attacked Thaksin and said that because of 
his interest in commercial satellites he was obstructing the military satellite program.214  
And since assuming the Post of Prime Minister several high profile political rows 
between him and the military have developed.  In 2002, Prime Minister Thaksin shrewdly 
reappointed General Surayud from the post of army chief in a de facto demotion.  
General Surayud was seen to have the support of General Prem and in turn the monarchy 
but his increasing disputes with Thaksin over drug-combating efforts led to the 
reshuffle.215  But Thaksin perhaps has come to the realization that co-opting vice 
competing with the military will be more conducive to his consolidation of power.  
Since being elected in 2001, PM Thaksin has set out to transform the country's 
three branches of the armed forces - the Royal Thai Army, the navy and the air force - 
into another branch of his power base. The approach he used to achieve such a goal 
involved meddling with the military's internal promotions.  In 2003, Thaksin appointed 
his cousin as commander in chief of the Army.  This has been combined with placing 35 
of his cadet school classmates to key military posts, creating for himself a remarkable 
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base of loyal supporters, several of whom commanded key frontline troops.216  His 
personalization of the military is a dangerous precedent and not conducive to objective 
civilian control of the military.   
 
1. Personnel Decisions  
Prime Minister Thaksin has played a significant role in the appointment of key 
posts within the military.  Early on in his term, he appointed no less than 53 Army 
generals to posts as advisor to the prime minister, basing these appointees at Ban 
Phitsanlulok.217  These positions help to strengthen Thaksin’s patronage and support 
from the military.  As touched on earlier, Thaksin has pushed some members of his own 
family and no fewer then 35 of his former cadet-school classmates collectively know as 
"Class 10", up the seniority ladder in the army and, to a lesser extent, in the navy and the 
air force. In doing so, he has shaped a powerful new clique that owes a lot to him and 
little to ability and seniority. 218  Prime Minister Thaksin has also used the annual 
military reshuffle as an excuse to dismiss opposition and strengthen his base of support.  
Thaksin’s removal of Surayud, who disagreed with Thaksin over the Burma drug war 
issue, allowed Thaksin to not only dispose of perceived opposition but also opened the 
door for Chaisit Shinawatra’s (Thaksin’s cousin) appointment to Army Commander.  As 
early as the 2002 military reshuffle the extent to which Thaksin was succeeding in 
politicizing and centralizing all decision making powers relating to the military in the 
prime minister was clearly being demonstrated.219  And with his recent landslide victory 
in the 2005 elections, it seems likely that Prime Minister Thaksin will continue to 
consolidate his control over the decision-making authority over personnel decisions 
within the military.220 
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2. Force Levels 
Modernization of Thailand military structure requires a reduction in unnecessary 
military personnel in order for resources to be better spent on more effective defense 
equipment.221  Yet it does not appear Prime Minister Thaksin is ready to confront the 












Table 7.   Armed Forces Personnel 2001-2003222 
 
In 2004, about 70 percent the Thai military budget was allocated for personnel 
and administrative expenses, and only 5-10 percent was likely to be invested in new 
defense equipment.223  It is clear that the Thaksin administration must reduce the size of 
the armed forces which has become increasingly bloated.  Yet it appears as if Thaksin 
would rather secure support from the military than challenge it; particularly in one of the 
military’s institutional domains.224 
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3. Military Budget 
Prime Minister Thaksin’s support for increased military spending has only helped 
bolster his support from the military.  Since 2001, Thaksin has increased the military 
budget, lifted the embargo on military procurements that had been in place since the 1997 
Asian financial crisis, and approved the entire army's spending list for the 2005-13 
period.225  Yet a careful analysis shows that the military budget as a percent of Gross 
Domestic Product, military funding has actually decreased from 1.48% in 2001 to 1.43% 
in 2003.226  During 2003, Thai economic growth reached a post-crisis high of 6.7%, and 
for the years 2001-2002 the economic growth for Thailand averaged 5 percent.227  Yet 
military spending increased by 1.7% from 2001-2003.228 This demonstrates that with a 
developing Thai economy Thaksin has been able to continue to increase military 
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Table 8.   Military Expenditure 2001-2003229 
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Though willing in principle to support military requests for increased spending, 
Thaksin has sought to gain personal control of such allocations, ensuring that all such 
requests would be channeled through him.230  Thaksin has shown little inclination to reel 
in the military with budget cuts; instead it appears that he has used his power in 
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Table 9.   Defense Budget % GDP 2001-2003231 
 
4. Military Reforms 
Although it appears Thaksin may have the decision-making authority and possibly 
sufficient control of the military there seems no will on his part to implement needed 
reforms; particularly troop levels and the promotion process.  Perhaps based on his earlier 
confrontations with the military or his private sector business experience that has 
involved collaborating with vested interests rather than challenging them, there has been 
little pressure to reform the military.  And of the reforms Thaksin implemented, they 
appear to be a step backwards.  The direct politicization of the promotion process, cabinet 
reshuffles aimed at centralizing all decision-making powers relating to the military, and 
the creation of a network of supporters within the armed forces has not moved the reform 
process closer to developing objective civilian control of the Thai military. The military 
no longer has to be so discreet or defensive about its relationships with the holders of 
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economic and political power; the period of quasi-penance following the May 1992 
events seems to be over, and Thailand may be reverting to a kind of pre-reform mode of 
civil-military relation.232  The difference being that the pendulum has swung and the 
military is being used as an instrument to consolidate one man’s grip on power. 
 
E.  CONCLUSION 
  
Having analyzed three very distinct periods in Thailand’s history it is clear to see 
some trends that have developed regarding the military’s autonomy in the political and 
institutional realms.  The shift has been from a strong dominant military with a great deal 
of autonomy with little to no opposition of competition from civilian leaders to a more 
dominant civilian leadership.  By analyzing four critical factors; personnel decisions, 
troop levels, military budget, and military reforms it can be demonstrated the decision-
making authority in the institutional decision sites has not shifted as much as in the 
political autonomy sphere of influence.  The following table clearly demonstrates the 
evolving shift: 
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*These are relative, not absolute figures used to determine the Thai military’s 
level of autonomy in the decision-making ability in the corresponding categories.  Levels 
of military autonomy based on a qualitative assessment; H=High, M=Medium, L=Low. 
The analysis clearly demonstrates a shift over time in the military’s autonomy in 
both the institutional and political spheres of influence.  The Thai military still maintains 
a level of autonomy within the institutional decision areas but the trend seems to indicate 
a greater level of civilian control in the political realm.  During the Thanom period the 
military had a high level of autonomy in both the institutional and political spheres of 
influence.  This is in contrast to the situation today under Prime Minister Thaksin where 
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*From the previous table qualitative assessments of military autonomy were 
assigned a numerical value.  These are relative, not absolute figures used to determine the 
Thai military’s level of autonomy in the decision-making ability in the corresponding 
categories.  Levels of military autonomy based on a qualitative assessment; High=2, 
Medium=1, Low=0. 
The data suggests that the decision-making authority has shifted away from the 
military; particularly in the political realm.  The military’s control over professional 
functions and internal reforms remain at a higher level.  This is demonstrated by the 
resistance to reduce troop levels.  Although there are some generally positive trends in 
the level of civilian control of the military because of Thaksin’s willingness to co-opt and 
secure support from the military as a means to strengthen his power base there are some 
also some concerns.  As Thaksin continues to try to convert the military into a direct 
source of military support and a major component of his power base the focus will shift 
into what type of civilian control is being implemented.233 
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*Note: A 2 indicates a relatively high level of military autonomy and a 0 indicates a 
relatively low level of military autonomy. 
 
"The re-politicization of the military is very dangerous for Thailand and for 
Thaksin himself; he cannot handle it," said Professor Ukrist Pathmanand, assistant 
director of the Institute of Asian Studies at Bangkok's Chulalongkorn University and co-
author of the book The Thaksinization of Thailand.234  The shifting of decision-making 
authority from the military to the civilian leadership would at the surface appear to be a 
positive trend towards more democratic civilian control of the government.  Yet this 
positive trend has the distinct possibility of being high jacked along the way and turned 
into a subjectively controlled military by an authoritarian leaning prime minister.  The 
next chapter will analyze and recommend policy options available to the United States 
that can assist Thailand in achieving a more democratic objective control of the Thai 
military. 
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V. U.S. POLICY OPTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. US POLICY AND THAI CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 
 
Current trends indicate that since the events of “Black May” in 1992 the civilian 
governments in Thailand have exerted greater control over a once autonomous Thai 
military.  Having looked at the evolving role of the Thai military in the political process 
this chapter will now explore what policy options are available to U.S. policy makers to 
assist Thailand towards strengthening civilian control and developing stable civil-military 
relations.   It is then important to analyze what policy options the United States should 
implement to help Thai civilian leaders consolidate control of the military.  After 
developing policy recommendations this chapter will discuss how these policies may be 
implemented, and the impact that they may have. 
Thailand, and its future as a stable democracy, plays a vital role in the strategic 
interests of the United States.  U.S.-Thailand relations are of great interest to America 
because of Thailand’s status as a long-time military ally with ongoing relevance to U.S. 
logistical operations in Iraq, a key country in the war on terrorism in Southeast Asia, and 
a significant trade and economic partner.235  As a major non-NATO ally in the Global 
War on Terror, Thailand has been a key supporter of the current administrations policies; 
as demonstrated both by the government’s decision in 2003 to contribute troops to 
Operation Iraqi Freedom and by actively participating in counterterrorism measures in 
Southeast Asia.236  In addition to relying on support from the Thai government the 
United States has an interest in seeing a stable democracy emerging in Thailand.   
In order for the United States to be able to depend on Thai support and stability it 
is important for policy makers to understand the reforms taking place in the Thai political 
system and the possible implications on future U.S./Thai relations.   As part of the Global 
War On Terror (GWOT) the Bush administration has preached the importance of 
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spreading liberty.  A stable liberal democratic system in Thailand is in America’s interest 
because stability and economic development along the lines of the American democratic 
model are likely to produce closer alignment of similar interests in a global environment.  
Thailand’s progress towards developing into a stable liberal democratic state depends on 
competent democratic civilian control of the military.  In order to develop a coherent 
strategy for Thai civilian-military assistance, U.S. policymakers must first understand the 
political dynamics and the evolving role of various political groups in Thailand, 
particularly the military. 
 
B. U.S. POLICY OPTIONS 
 
According to Samuel P. Huntington, a key aspect to improving civil-military 
relations is the restructuring of militaries toward military missions.237   Prior to the defeat 
of the communist insurgency in 1984 Thailand’s military was able to orient itself towards 
military missions.  From 1932 to the defeat of Communism a clearly defined threat 
helped dictate a military mission for the military.  As part of the strategy to defeat 
communism the military focused on development.238  After the defeat of communism in 
the early 1980’s the Thai military had no clearly defined enemy and was struggling to 
find a new mission.239  Domestic security issues are better suited for lightly armed police 
and intelligence forces.  That is why it is important Thailand has recently been designated 
as a major Non-NATO ally by the United States.  By designating them as a Non-NATO 
ally it will open up access to Excess Defense Articles on a grant basis under section 516 
of the Foreign Assistance Act in FY 2005.240  EDA grants will advance interoperability, 
counterterrorism, counter narcotics and coalition peacekeeping goals while enhancing 
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U.S. influence and access.241  The more important aspect of being designated a major 
Non-NATO ally is it will give the Thai military an external military mission.  Thailand in 
the past has sent peacekeeping troops to East Timor, Afghanistan, and Iraq.  With the 
designation the United States can continue to seek viable military missions for the Thai 
military.  This mutually beneficial relationship will force the Thai military to focus on an 
external military mission and will allow the United States a critical role in help 
developing that mission. 
Thailand has gone through various crisis and military coups but overall has 
remained a picture of stability in a volatile region.  As the control of the military has 
evolved in Thailand it can perhaps be used as a model for neighboring Southeast Asian 
countries.  Myanmar, Philippines, and Indonesia have all struggled with civilian-military 
control.  Thailand could be a helpful participant in the dialogue and an exemplary model 
for these neighboring countries having moved towards civilian authority over its once 
politically dominant military.  Civilian members of the Armed Forces Committees from 
both houses of the Thai parliament could host conferences to discuss security issues with 
civilian contingents from the perspective countries. The interaction between civilian 
leadership in the various countries will promote greater awareness of the role civilians 
have to play concerning military and security issues.  Civilian leaders from the 
Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand could also discuss what reforms and strategies have 
been effective in exerting control over the military.  It may however be in the U.S.’s 
interest to act as a moderator in these talks to ensure positive aspects of civil-military 
relations are the goal and not simply collusion among nations struggling with control of 
the military.  The National Defense College of the Philippines has indicated its interest in 
hosting postgraduate courses for Asian officers with the assistance of foreign donors.242  
This multilateral approach of using dialogue and conferences with countries struggling 
with civilian military relations will allow Thailand to offer assistance to countries in its 
region  and  provide  insight into what structural changes are making their own transition  
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more or less effective.  Successful countries such as the United States, Malaysia, and 
Singapore could also be included in these conferences to offer an objective model for 
Thailand to strive for. 
The United States has funded various programs in the past to help develop a 
professional military and help strengthen civilian control of the military.  Among the 
programs funded by the United States include International Military Education and 
Training (IMET), economic support funding, peacekeeping operations funding, counter 
narcotics funding and anti-terrorism funding.  For a relatively modest investment in 
IMET, the U.S. has been well rewarded by the exposure of thousands of Thai military 
students to the “U.S. military establishment and the American way of life, including 
democratic values, respect for internationally recognized norms of human rights, the 
concept of civilian control of the armed forces and respect for the rule of law.”243  In the 
short term future it looks as if modest increases are expected in IMET funding.  In FY 
2004 Thai IMET funding was 2.45 million US dollars and FY 2005 request was 2.5 
million US dollars.244  In addition to IMET the U.S. plans to increase funding to the 
International Narcotics and Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) and Foreign Military 
Financing (FMF) programs.  Increased funding in already established programs will help 
assist Thailand in moving towards objective civilian control of the Thai military. 
As bilateral trade increases between the United States and Thailand, this 
economic development can be used to help influence the democratic reforms taking place 
in Thailand.  With two way trade between Thailand and the United States close to $21 
billion U.S. dollars a years this leverage can be used to help encourage democratic 
gains.245  As a Free Trade Agreement is in the process of being launch various US trade 
concessions could be directly tied either to democratic reforms or more specifically 
civilian/military control reforms.  By forcing the Thai military and the civilian leadership, 
specifically Thaksin to accept external pressure to implement domestic reforms would 
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only be likely to occur if they were tied directly to economic opportunity.  This carrot and 
stick approach tied to the bilateral Free Trade Agreement between the two countries 
could allow the stronger U.S. position to dictate positive reform of the civilian military 
control relationship. 
International institutions and influence can play a significant role in helping move 
democratic reforms forward in Thailand.  The United States can look to increase World 
Bank and International Monetary Fund funding to Thailand.  By helping to strengthen the 
institutions within Thailand established by the 1997 Constitution to include the 
Constitutional Court, National Counter Corruption Committee, and the Election 
Committee; the chances of domestic manipulation of democratic advancement would be 
less likely.246  It is important to strengthen these democratic institutions to make it less 
likely the Thai military or the civilian leadership will revert to more authoritarian 
tendencies. 
A final option the United States would have in assisting the civilian Thai 
leadership in obtaining objective democratic control of the military would be to “Trust 
the Thais.”  Although this is choice is more of an attitude vice a policy, it is still an 
option.  In choosing this option the United States would be leaving the progress of 
civilian control of the military to the influential political actors within Thailand.  If the 
assessment of the United States was that enough structural changes have been made for 
the functioning of a democratic military under civilian control in Thailand then this 
option may be a viable option.  A status quo could develop and the United States could 
just monitor progress vice trying to influence it.  By providing assistance only when 
assistance is sought the United States can play a supportive role only when called upon.  
The obvious drawback would be less direct influence and direction by U.S. policy 
makers. 
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In analyzing the policy options available to the United States much of the focus 
was on bilateral policies.  With the exception of using the Thai civilian/military 
relationship as a model, all of the proposed policies focus on the Thai-US relationship.  
The problem with developing more multilateral approaches with the regional leaders 
particularly China and Japan is that their civilian military relations are either deficient or 
180 degrees out from the United States’ position.  That does not mean these nations 
would be excluded, it just means the United States and its policies would play the 
dominant role with multilateral relations on the periphery. 
 
C. POLICY IMPLEMENTATION AND ASSESSMENT 
 
In order to achieve objective civilian control over a professional military Thailand 
faces two major obstacles.  The first obstacle is the legacy of military control of the 
political process.  The second is the fragile state of democracy in Thailand.  It is 
important to the United States as it implements policies to strengthen civilian control of 
the military to keep in mind continued democratization in Thailand is also necessary.  
Thus two strategies are necessary when implementing chosen policies.  A short term 
focus and a long term focus.  The short term policies will focus on reducing the military’s 
direct political influence.  The longer term strategies will focus on strengthening the 
authority and competency of the controllers themselves, the civilians.   
The best policy option to focus on based on the previous policy options would be 
to continue funding established programs to include IMET, ICIT, INCLE, and FMF 
among others.  Although not all of the other policy options would be discarded.  Several 
other policies could be implemented to help supplement the chosen policy.  An example 
of this would be to encourage Thailand to engage in multilateral conferences using their 
civilian military model as a model to neighboring countries but this would not be the 
focus of my chosen policy.  The focus of my chosen policy would be to increase funding 
to programs already in place and restructure the programs to make them more effective.  
This combined with short and long term goals will have a dramatic effect in moving 
Thailand towards democratic civilian supremacy over the Thai military.   
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By providing additional assistance in programs designed to strengthen civilian 
control of the military the United States could help assist Thailand in consolidating some 
of the gains made and allowing further reform.  Some of the implied goals the United 
States would achieve in providing additional assistance to Thailand are to enhance our 
influence in a strategically important region, strengthen Thailand’s effort to combat 
terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and other international crime and reinforce military 
cooperation with a treaty ally.247  The increased funding would call for a civilian 
coordinator in Thailand on the ambassador level with funding control to manage and 
implement a comprehensive program integrating a variety of civilian and military federal 
programs.   These programs would be developed with both a short and long term goals 
directly linked to funding requirements.  I will discuss some of the programs tied together 
through this coordinator and then focus on the short and long term goals they will seek to 
achieve. 
The preferred policy of increased funding offers training opportunities to both the 
Thai military and the Thai civilian leadership with an emphasis on achieving democratic 
civilian supremacy.  The United States Coordinator on Thai Civilian/Military affairs will 
have both a Department of Defense element and a civilian USAID component to provide 
a clear agenda on various programs already in place and funded by the United States.  In 
the past there has not been a clear agenda tying all the different programs together to have 
a comprehensive impact on Thai civilian military relations.  In order to strengthen 
civilian control of the military you cannot ignore the civilian side of the equation.  Two 
important goals often overlooked when focusing on civilian military affairs are enhancing 
the expertise of civilian officials in military matters and bolstering the effectiveness of 
lightly-armed police for internal security.248  In addition to monitoring the short and long 
term goals of the Thai civilian military funding the Coordinator would ensure the civilian 
programs complemented the military programs. 
The Department of Defense element will continue to focus on IMET funding, 
Expanded IMET, FMF, Center of National Defense, and designating Thailand a major 
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Non-NATO ally.  This element will continue to highlight the needed reforms and 
continued progress with a heavy focus on the Thai military.  IMET in addition to 
encouraging a more professional Thai military officer also improves interoperability and 
fosters US-Thai relationships among the militaries.  The expanded IMET program would 
and should focus on Human Rights issues both for the military and the police.  The 
increased FMF funding complements other security and counter narcotics-related 
programs in Thailand by enhancing the Thai military’s ability to combat terrorism, 
improving its interoperability with U.S. forces and increasing its capacity to control 
Thailand’s porous border with Burma.249  It will be important for the Coordinator to 
ensure the military’s focus is on the external threats and leave the internal security to the 
enhanced police force.  Under the umbrella of the Department of Defense the United 
States would increase funding to Thailand for the Center of National Defense in Hawaii.  
Thai civilians would take courses focusing on defense management skills, civil-military 
relations, budget operations, and defense spending.  Only after civilians are adequately 
knowledgeable in military affairs are they able to sufficiently debate and control military 
funding and control.  Tied into the increased funding would be the designation of 
Thailand as a major Non-NATO ally.  As touched on earlier this could play a crucial role 
in establishing an external mission for the Thai military.  This external mission could 
help to force some needed structural changes to perhaps include reducing the number of 
troops stationed in and around the capital by forcing the military to cope with mission 
oriented logistics.  The focus on the Thai military in helping to continue to reform the 
Thai civilian military relationship would fall under the Department of Defense much as it 
has in the past.  This element to be more effective as Thailand continues to develop must 
work with the civilian element to build a seamless agenda. 
Samuel Huntington has warned that “future problems in civil military relations in 
new democracies are likely to come not from the military but from the civilian side of the 
equation.”250  With the further “privatization” of the military under Prime Minister 
Thaksin it is easy to see why Huntington would make such a prediction.  Having 
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proposed a policy of increased funding to established U.S. funded programs a key factor 
in that success is the civilian element.  The civilian element of programs improved to 
improve civilian-military relations in Thailand would fall under the guidance of USAID.  
Among the key challenges for states undergoing a transition from military rule to more 
open, transparent systems is how to get defense right after years of military rule.251  
Fortunately, this is something USAID has experience in.  USAID plays a special role in 
analyzing and improving civil-military relations.  The role of USAID in Thailand will be 
to focus on the necessary civilian programs necessary to improve democratic civilian 
supremacy over the military.  Without a viable, educated, articulated civilian leadership 
in regards to military affairs it is unlikely if not impossible to effectively control the 
military.    
Under the direction of USAID and ultimately accountable to the leadership of the 
Coordinator I would recommend increased funding in various established “civilian” 
programs in order to improve civilian-military relations.  The first and some of the most 
closely related to the Department of Defense element programs include the police and 
internal security programs.  It would be important to integrate these programs with the 
military but it would be critical that USAID and Department of Defense working together 
draw an obvious line between civilian and military missions.  Through the Department of 
Justice but accountable to USAID increased funding for the International Criminal 
Investigative Training would help bolster the Thai police forces.  Thailand has struggled 
with the role of the military particularly the developmental role.  Close cooperation 
between USAID, the Thai military, and civilian leaders can professionalize the military 
and the police will meeting all of Thailand’s security needs.  International Narcotics 
Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE), Nonproliferation, Demining, and Related 
Programs (NADR), and Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance (EXBS) 
programs are all necessary programs to ensure Thai and US security but the all need 
supervision by USAID to ensure a coherent strategy of police functions, military 
missions, intelligence communications, and human rights are effectively implemented.  
Multilaterally, INCLE funds the International Law Enforcement Academy in Bangkok, a 
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cooperative U.S.-Thai undertaking.252  These programs are critical to establishing a 
professional, competent, and effective police force in order to reorient the military to 
military missions.  That is not to say at times these missions will not overlap but with 
proper supervision of USAID Thai police, military, and security forces can effectively 
meet security needs and promote civilian control of a military mission oriented military.   
The chosen policy option would in addition to bolstering the civilian police forces 
also bolster the civilian leadership under the direction of USAID.  In order to enhance the 
expertise of civilian officials in military matters the Thai civilian leadership could work 
with both the United States Institute for Peace and the National Endowment for 
Democracy.  The United States Institute for Peace, an independent government think tank 
provides research and assistance on civil-military relations and the National Endowment 
for Democracy is a quasi-governmental agency that contributes to civil-military relations 
in developing states.  Through increased funding to these two institutions assistance to 
the Thai civilian leadership can help develop the necessary tools to implement effective 
civilian control of the military.   
Using a multilateral approach USAID can direct and coordinate with the United 
Nations Development Program, encourage Japan to increase funding, and encourage 
dialogue with neighboring countries.  The United Nations Development Program 
sponsors programs, seminars, and conferences on civil-military relations.  By exposing 
Thailand to a diverse set of civil-military relations the Thai civilian leadership can pick 
and choose what they would consider effective policies and apply it to their state.  The 
United States could also encourage Japan, who has been seeking a larger regional role, to 
increase funding, dialogue, and educational programs.  USAID with experience in the 
region could encourage dialogue between Indonesia, Philippines, and Thailand.  In 2001, 
a USAID-assisted team of civilian military experts drafted defense related legislation 
which  the  Indonesian  parliament  chose to adapt.   USAID  is  also  supporting  civilian  
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participation in the drafting of a defense white paper which civilian reformers were the 
key actors.253  This invaluable experience would assist the Thai civilian leadership a 
great deal.   
Having analyzed the two elements to the increased funding, the civilian and the 
military, it is important to focus on both the short and long term goals of each element.  
The short term goals would highlight among other factors; establishing “integral” 
boundaries between military and civilian institutions, greater international rather than 
domestic orientation of the military, active encouragement of disengagement from 
politics, and emphasis on greater structural differentiation (focusing on police units).254  
Examples of short term goals could include structural changes such as legislative budget 
appropriations and formal control over promotions of military officers to the highest 
ranks.  These short term goals will allow the Coordinator to help analyze on a yearly 
basis what policies and programs are more effective.  The Coordinator could use his 
funding leverage to tie reforms to additional funding.  Short term goals should have an 
overarching long term strategy. 255  The long term strategy in Thailand’s case should be 
to establish a competent civilian leadership in military affairs.  The Thai civilian 
leadership is hesitant to confront the military concerning budgets, stationing of troops, 
and policies because of a certain lack of expertise in the military arena.  With the 
development of civilian military experts a real debate can occur over civilian control of 
the military.  With the Thai civilian leadership deferring military matters to military 
leaders true civilian supremacy will not be achieved. 
The policy this chapter has chosen to propose takes into account programs already 
in place.  The only real fundamental change is the coordination of these programs.  Civil-
military affairs are a complex and challenging relationship.  In the past the primary focus 
has been on only one side of the equation, the military side.  In addition to looking at the 
civilian side of the equation it is important to integrate and complement the existing 
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programs in order to develop a coherent focused strategy to help Thailand consolidate the 
progress it has made in democratic civilian control of the military.  This chapter has 
proposed a Thai Civilian/Military Coordinator to oversee and implement the difficult task 
of integrating these diverse and complementing programs.  On a yearly basis he will be 
able to evaluate short term goals and increase or decrease funding to effective and 
ineffective programs.  While implementing these short term goals a longer term goal of 





Thailand has a legacy of military rule.  It wasn’t until 1988 that effective civilian 
leadership was given a chance to begin to develop.  Since 1992 it appears as if the Thai 
military has returned to the barracks but effective civilian control of the military still 
faces many obstacles.  With these obstacles in mind I have proposed a variety of possible 
US policy options.  The options ranged from “Trusting the Thais” to using economic 
pressure to force reform.  This chapter settled on a policy of increased funding for 
programs already in place.  But if funding is to be increased without several key changes 
it seems unlikely Thailand will transition to democratic civilian supremacy.  The key 
changes I suggested were appointing a Coordinator to effectively develop a strategy to 
link all the diverse yet interrelated programs.  Another key change was to have USAID 
direct the entire civilian element of the civil-military relations.  In the past these programs 
have fallen under the Department of Justice and the Drug Enforcement Agency with little 
to no regard on their effect on civil-military relations.  Increased funding can only give 
Thailand the tools necessary to put in place and build on some the democratic reforms 
necessary to have complete civilian supremacy.  The integration of the Department of 
Defense programs and the civilian USAID programs will allow Thailand to have an 
effective short and long term strategy to ensure consolidation of the gains they have made 
in civilian control of the military. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
Since 1992, the military has undergone a significant change in attitude and ability 
to exert its influence on Thai politics.  The military starting in 1992 has promoted 
professionalism among the ranks and began focusing its energies on restructuring and 
modernizing its forces.256  The military has since 1992 remained neutral in election 
campaigns, did not intervene in politics during the financial crisis, and no new military-
backed political parties have formed.257   
In addition after the 1997 constitution several structural changes were 
implemented to consolidate civilian control of the military.  Among these were a reduced 
role for the military in cabinets and the Senate.  Starting in 2000 Senate members are now 
elected vice appointed and active duty members are no longer eligible for cabinet 
positions or the Senate258.  The 1997 constitution also called for an elected Prime 
Minister.259 The appointed Senate positions and previous constitutions allowing an 
appointed Prime Minister were powerful tools in the past for the military to gain political 
control.  It is possible that the Thai military has turned a corner with the younger 
generation of officers growing up in democratic apolitical military environment.  There 
have been encouraging signs since the events of 1992 indicating the military has decided 
it no longer has an interest in direct control of political affairs.260 
It has been argued that “whether military elites were united or not, their political 
centrality was eroded during the events following May 1992 by the bourgeoisie and the 
middle class.”261  This is a valid argument.  This thesis makes the case the rise of a 
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business class and political parties with support from the Monarchy played an integral 
part as critical parameter for the development towards greater civilian control of the Thai 
military.   
Concerning this development, the analysis in chapter III has shown that three 
factors external to the armed forces enabled an environment for greater civilian control of 
the military in Thailand.  The first critical factor to civilian control of the Thai armed 
forces was the economic development witnessed by Thailand from the 1970’s to 1992.262  
This economic development produced a capital class that sought greater political 
influence.  An outlet for the increasingly influential business leaders became political 
parties.  Because of the Thai military’s willingness to allow political space; political 
parties were able to develop into a viable institution able to counterbalance the political 
role of the military.  Having developed as an alternative institution the political parties 
were able to fill the political vacuum created after the events of 1992.  Yet without the 
role the Monarchy played, it is unlikely the military would have been forced to return to 
the barracks.  The Monarchy provided legitimacy to the appointed civilian leadership.  
Civilian leadership, after 1992 was able to exert small but increasing control over a once 
politically dominant military. 
The analysis in Chapter IV suggests that Thailand has witnessed greater civilian 
control in both the political realm and on institutional issues from Prime Minister’s 
Thanom’s rule through Prime Minister Thaksin’s first administration.  It was during PM 
Thanom’s reign, that military autonomy in both the institutional and political arenas was 
relatively high.  The military from 1963-1973, clearly dictated the political decision 
making authority and maintained independence from civilian influence in the 
professional decision areas.  The period following the events of 1992 through 2001 
illustrated greater civilian control over the once autonomous Thai armed forces.   
The post-1992 era witnessed greater intervention by civilian in the personnel 
decision process and for a brief period a reduction in force levels.  Attempts were made 
by civilian leadership to address the overstaffing of generals in the ranks, yet the military 
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was able to effectively resist the proposed programs.263  This indicated a greater will on 
the part of civilian leadership, compared to the Thanom period, to intervene in what 
traditionally has been a professional function.  However, the military ability to resist 
change demonstrated the armed forces still had control over most internal issues.  
Another decision site that demonstrated an evolving level of civilian control in the 
institutional sphere of influence was troop levels.  The civilian leadership was able to 
reduce force levels starting in 1994 by 50,000 troops.264  Troop levels remained at this 
reduced level until 1998, coincidently the same time as Thailand was feeling the effects 
of the Asian Financial Crisis.265  From 1998-2001 troop levels returned to their 1992 
levels showing the military’s ability to continue to exert influence on areas viewed as a 
core issue.  In the political arena, civilians exerted greater control over the military than 
in the Thanom period.  Military expenditures were reduced steadily from 1996-2001, 
indicating an increased ability of civilian leadership to dictate how and where limited 
government resources were to be allocated.266  The military reforms implemented by the 
Army Chief General Surayud, under the leadership of PM Chuan, displayed the rising 
influence of civilian authority compared to 1963-1973. 
The final period analyzed, the first term of the Thaksin administration (2001-
2004), indicated a trend of increased civilian control of the military compared to both the 
post-1992 era and the Thanom rule.  In the first decision site of institutional autonomy, 
personnel decisions, Prime Minister Thaksin exerted far more influence and independent 
decision making authority than Thailand has ever witnessed.  His ability to effectively 
appoint his supporters to key posts within the armed forces has created a situation where 
the armed forces threaten to become an instrument to consolidate his power.267  In the 
other area of institutional autonomy, force levels, PM Thaksin has not reduced the 
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number of troops.  The analyses suggests however, this may illustrate his willingness to 
co-opt the military vice confront a possible power base.268  On the political side of the 
spectrum, PM Thaksin and his administration exert greater control of the military 
compared to the two previous periods.  Although during PM’s Thaksin’s first term the 
military budget has increased if you analyze the budget as a percentage of Gross 
Domestic Product the budget has actually decreased.269  What this clearly demonstrates is 
the politically savvy of PM Thaksin who is able to keep the armed forces well funded yet 
still divert additional governmental resources to other programs.  The final area of 
political autonomy, military reform, shows a centralization of all decision making powers 
relating to the military going through one man, PM Thaksin. 
As the Thai military retreats to the barracks Thailand and more civilian control is 
exerted on the military the issue of objective or subjective control becomes relevant. The 
consolidation of power by PM Thaksin and the Thai Rak Thai is threatening to many 
intellectuals in Thailand.  The ability of one man to harness vast amounts of power, 
threatens the democratic process and the future of civilian control over the military.  
Thaksin has recently appointed his cousin Chaisith Shinawatra as commander-in-chief of 
the army.270  In addition, he has elevated a host of his former military prepatory 
schoolmates to key commands of the army, navy, air force, and police.271  The possible 
consequence of this consolidation of power can lead to the Thai armed forces becoming a 
“tool” in the consolidation of PM Thaksin’s grip on power.  As he continues to appoint 
supporters to key positions in the military the possibility of disgruntled officers within the 
military developing a competing faction increases.  If no opposition develops to the 
appointments of Thaksin supporters then the Thai military will become increasingly loyal 
to an individual and not the democratic institutions.  The threat of subjective control of 
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the Thai military seriously threatens the democratic development of Thailand.  The 
progress made in Thailand’s civil-military relations regarding civilian control of the 
military will be lost if that control reverts from democratic control to subjective control.   
The United States has taken on a business as usual attitude toward these alarming 
developments.  This thesis proposed the most logical course of action to assist Thailand 
in achieving democratic civilian control of the military- tying together diverse programs 
into a coherent strategy.  The interests of the United States are benefited by seeing further 
objective civilian control of the Thai Military.  The policy proposed by this thesis of 
increasing funding of programs already in place and placing the responsibility to 
implement these programs under a coherent strategy offers the best option to the United 
States in assisting Thailand achieve democratic civilian control of its military.  Increasing 
funding without an integrated strategy will not be successful.  Both sides of the civil-
military relationship equation must participate.  Currently, the focus is primarily on the 
military side.  The Thai military has increasingly shown its willingness to remain in the 
barracks and become professional soldiers.  By increasing funding to established 
programs the U.S. can continue to offer training to military forces yet it can also provide 
opportunities to civilian leaders to gain technical and professional expertise in the 
security and military arenas.  Civilian leaders educated in the complex issues regarding 
military and security affairs are necessary for continued progress in democratic control of 
the Thai military.  Without more civilian expertise the repoliticization of the Thai 
military, either overtly or under subjective civilian control of PM Thaksin, becomes more 
likely 
Prime Minister Thaksin recently won a second term in office with an 
overwhelming majority in the parliament.  Civil-military relations in Thailand are in 
danger of taking a step “backwards.”  Despite the fact there has been a generally positive 
trend towards greater civilian control of the military since the Thanom’s rule PM 
Thaksin’s attempts to employ the Thai military as a tool of his personal power base 
threaten this trend.  Because U.S.-Thai bilateral security cooperation has a long history, 
the United States has an opportunity to use this unique relationship to assist a friendly 
nation in achieving democratic control of its Armed Forces.  At this critical juncture in 
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Thailand’s political development it is critical to have a clearly defined policy to match 
our strategic interest in seeing Thailand continue its democratic progress. 
As more data becomes available during Thaksin’s second term as Prime Minister 
more information on the trends in civilian control of the military will become available.  
Further studies can also examine different areas within the political and institutional areas 
of autonomy to include: military education, military doctrine, arms production, arms 
procurement, intelligence gathering, internal security, and human rights.  Moreover, 
additional research can be done considering the impact of subjective or objective civilian 
control on the Thai military.  Thailand appears to be transitioning through a unique 
period in its political development.  An elected Prime Minister not only made it through 
an entire term but was re-elected to anther four years in office.  The question of with so 
many supporters in powerful positions in the Armed forces will Thaksin be able to retain 
his hold on power for a third, fourth, or fifth term in office if he so chooses.  Based on 
past events, at the end of PM Thaksin’s second term the transfer of power or retention of 
power may lead to instability.  It is therefore critical both to study trends and 
developments in Thaksin’s second administration to be better prepared for possible 
confrontations.   
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